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203 
THE JURISDICTIONAL BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE 
OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT AND THE COURT 
OF CRIMINAL APPEALS: BLURRED LINES 
GREG EDDINGTON* 
Oklahoma is one of only two states—the other being Texas—with two 
courts of last resort: one with civil appellate jurisdiction and the other 
criminal. The original Oklahoma Constitution provided an option for the 
legislature to create a criminal court of appeals,1 and the legislature did so 
the next year.2 After an initial period sorting out the types of cases that fell 
on each side of the boundary, the two courts existed relatively free from 
jurisdictional conflict throughout the first hundred years of their 
coexistence. In fact, in 1978, the Oklahoma Supreme Court wrote that  
[i]t speaks well of our bifurcated civil-criminal appellate system 
that there has not been a jurisdictional conflict between this 
Court and the Court of Criminal Appeals for more than fifty 
years. This scarcity of conflict is a testament to both the clarity 
of jurisdictional boundaries between the two Courts and the 
constant willingness of the members of each Court to observe 
and comply with their jurisdictional restrictions.3  
In the last five years, this spirit of comity appears to have deteriorated. 
The supreme court has addressed the jurisdictional boundary several times 
in reported opinions, usually followed by a rebuttal from the court of 
criminal appeals. The most well-known case, Lockett v. Evans,4 nearly 
provoked a constitutional crisis in 2014 when the supreme court issued a 
stay of a prisoner’s execution,5 and the governor issued an executive order 
declining to “give effect” to the stay.6 A jurisdictional conflict arose again 
in 2016,7 with one court of criminal appeals judge suggesting that the 
                                                                                                                 
 * Director of Legal Research and Writing, Oklahoma City University School of Law. 
 1. OKLA. CONST. art. 7, § 2 (amended 1967). 
 2. 1907-1908 Okla. Sess. Laws 291. 
 3. Carder v. Court of Criminal Appeals, 1978 OK 130, ¶ 1, 595 P.2d 416, 417-18 
(footnote omitted). 
 4. (Lockett IV), 2014 OK 34, 330 P.3d 488 (per curiam). 
 5. Lockett v. Evans (Lockett III), 2014 OK 33, 356 P.3d 58 (per curiam) (mem.). 
 6. 31 Okla. Reg. 618 (Apr. 22, 2014). 
 7. Meyer v. Smith, 2015 OK 86, 366 P.3d 311; Meyer v. Engle, 2016 OK CR 1, 369 
P.3d 37.  
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legislature might need to intervene and “reaffirm this Court’s exclusive 
appellate jurisdiction in criminal matters.”8 
Much has been written in critique of subject-matter judicial 
specialization.9 This article addresses only one of the common criticisms as 
it applies to the Oklahoma system: boundary problems. This article reviews 
the history of the jurisdictional boundary drawing in Oklahoma, with 
particular attention given to the principles advanced by the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court to support its occasional incursions into what appear at first 
blush to have been criminal cases. The article then analyzes the recent 
conflicts, particularly the one in Lockett, examining the positions of both 
courts in light of that history. Finally, the article concludes with 
comparisons to analogous issues in Texas and recommendations for 
resolution of the current state of jurisdictional bickering. 
I. The Creation of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals 
The Oklahoma Constitution was adopted in 1907. It created a supreme 
court, district courts, and other inferior courts such as county courts and 
municipal courts.10 Initially, the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court 
extended to all civil and criminal cases.11 But the original constitution 
granted the supreme court criminal appellate jurisdiction only “until a 
Criminal Court of Appeals with exclusive appellate jurisdiction in criminal 
cases shall be established by law.”12 The constitution also provided that the 
supreme court’s original jurisdiction extended “to a general superintending 
control over all inferior courts and all commissions and boards created by 
law.”13 Finally, the supreme court was authorized to issue writs.14 
The history of the constitution does not indicate why its framers chose to 
include the option of bifurcated appellate jurisdiction. Presumably, they 
were undecided about whether to follow the Texas model—two coequal 
                                                                                                                 
 8. Engle, ¶ 3, 369 P.3d at 42 (Lewis, J., specially concurring).  
 9. See generally Paul R. Gugliuzza, Rethinking Federal Jurisdiction, 100 
GEORGETOWN L.J. 1437 (2012); Chad M. Oldfather, Judging, Expertise, and the Rule of 
Law, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 847 (2012); Richard A. Posner, Will the Federal Courts of 
Appeals Survive Until 1984? An Essay on Delegation and Specialization of the Judicial 
Function, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 761 (1983). 
 10. OKLA. CONST. art. 7, § 1 (amended 1967). 
 11. Id. art. 7, § 2. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
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highest courts—or the model of the other forty-five states that had one 
supreme court with both civil and criminal jurisdiction. In any event, the 
legislature quickly created a criminal court of appeals in 1908, with 
“exclusive appellate jurisdiction . . . in all criminal cases appealed from” 
other courts.15 The court also had the power to issue writs of habeas corpus 
and “writs as may be necessary to exercise its jurisdiction.”16 In 1959, the 
court was renamed the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (COCA) and 
still bears that name.17  
The available legislative history of the enactment consists solely of a 
message from the governor urging passage.18 The message noted that the 
supreme court was “completely snowed under” and that “the speedy trial 
and termination of criminal cases and the establishing of precedents by a 
court of last resort for the guidance of local courts . . . is not only a 
desirable thing but the cheapest way to conduct the criminal prosecutions of 
the State.”19 The governor calculated that the cost of keeping two or three 
prisoners per county awaiting trial for the long period then existing would 
amount to more than the cost of a court of criminal appeals.20  
The statute originally provided that COCA had exclusive appellate 
jurisdiction over criminal cases, unless the construction of the Oklahoma 
Constitution, the Constitution of the United States, or an act of Congress 
was in question, in which the case the court was to certify the question to 
the Oklahoma Supreme Court and await its decision.21 The statute was 
amended in 1909 to eliminate that limitation, leaving COCA with exclusive 
appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases.22 
In 1967, the Oklahoma Constitution was amended. The amended 
constitution now vests jurisdiction in COCA, recognizing its exclusive 
appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases, but with a proviso that the 
jurisdiction of the court is subject to the power of the legislature to alter.23 
The amendment also gave COCA the power to issue writs in “criminal 
                                                                                                                 
 15. 20 OKLA. STAT. § 40 (2011). 
 16. Id. § 41. 
 17. Id. § 31.1. 
 18. Message from the Governor, H. Journal, 1st Leg. 350, 357-58 (Okla., Mar. 30, 
1908). 
 19. Id. at 357. 
 20. Id. 
 21. 1907-1908 Okla. Sess. Laws 291.  
 22. 1909 Okla. Sess. Laws 171-72.  
 23. OKLA. CONST. art. 7, § 1 (amended 1967).  
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matters.”24 Most importantly, the amended constitution explicitly provides 
that in the event of conflict between the two courts regarding jurisdiction, 
“the Supreme Court shall determine which court has jurisdiction and such 
determination shall be final.”25 The amended version made no change to the 
supreme court’s general superintending power or power to issue writs. 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court and courts of other states whose 
constitutions contain similar language consider that language as creating 
three types of jurisdiction: appellate, superintending control, and writ.26 
Appellate jurisdiction is used to decide appeals from final orders or certain 
interlocutory orders.27 Superintending-control jurisdiction is used to control 
the course of litigation in inferior courts,28 and as discussed below, has been 
used more broadly. Writ jurisdiction may be used to issue common-law 
writs in multiple circumstances, including circumstances outside 
superintending control of other courts,29 but Oklahoma and other states 
have noted that the two types of jurisdiction, “while separate and distinct, 
are closely related,” and “[i]t is not always easy or necessary to note the 
line of demarcation between the two.”30 In practice, the difference between 
the two types of jurisdiction is that superintending-control jurisdiction is 
broader: although it is usually exercised via writ, superintending-control 
jurisdiction allows for remedies other than writs, for example, declaratory 
relief.31 
                                                                                                                 
 24. Id. art. 7, § 4.  
 25. Id.  
 26. E.g., State ex rel. Fourth Nat’l Bank of Phila. v. Johnson, 79 N.W. 1081, 1086 (Wis. 
1899). The Oklahoma Supreme Court actually considers itself to have five types of 
jurisdiction, adding jurisdiction to determine whether it or COCA has jurisdiction in a 
particular case, and “further jurisdiction [as may be] conferred by statute.” Cline v. Okla. 
Coal. for Reprod. Justice, 2013 OK 93, ¶ 6, 313 P.3d 253, 256 (citing OKLA. CONST. art. 7, § 
4).  
 27. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 952 (2011). 
 28. Fourth Nat’l Bank, 79 N.W. at 1087. 
 29. See Ethics Comm’n v. Cullison, 1993 OK 37, ¶ 8, 850 P.2d 1069, 1085 (“Writs . . . 
are mere remedial devices for redressing a variety of governmental usurpation and private 
abuse of power . . . .”) (Opala, J., concurring in result). 
 30. Bd. of Comm'rs of Harmon Cty. v. Keen, 1994 OK 243, ¶ 5, 153 P.2d 483, 485 
(invoking superintending control to issue writ prohibiting trial judge from proceeding with 
case); see, e.g., Petition of Heil, 284 N.W. 42, 46 (Wis. 1938).  
 31. See, e.g., Cullison, ¶ 37, 850 P.2d at 1080 (issuing declaratory relief regarding the 
constitutionality of a statute). The distinction between writ jurisdiction and superintending-
control jurisdiction is not particularly helpful. For example, in Dutton v. City of Midwest 
City, 2015 OK 51, ¶¶ 22-26, 353 P.3d 532, 542-45, the court attempted to explain the 
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Regarding superintending control (the 1967 amendment changed the 
term to “superintendent”),32 the framers of the Oklahoma Constitution 
presumably adopted this language from that of numerous other state 
constitutions with similar provisions, which those states had adopted from 
the model of King’s Bench in England.33 Blackstone had characterized this 
power as “high and transcendent,” and as “keep[ing] all inferior 
jurisdictions within the bounds of their authority.”34 Other states had 
considered the power “as broad as the exigencies of the case demand.”35 
The Oklahoma Constitution grants the supreme court this power over “all 
inferior courts” as well as agencies, boards, and commissions.36  
In older, pre-constitutional amendment opinions, the supreme court 
specifically classified COCA as an “inferior” court subject to 
superintending control.37 The supreme court based this analysis on COCA’s 
absence from the original constitution, along with the constitution’s 
provision that other courts “inferior to the Supreme Court . . . may be 
established by law.”38 Because COCA’s existence depended on its being 
established by the legislature, the supreme court found it clearly within the 
definition of an “inferior” court, subject to superintending control.39 As 
                                                                                                                 
distinction, giving examples of both types. One case, State v. Lynch, 1990 OK 82, 796 P.2d 
1150, was listed as an example for each type of jurisdiction, indicating that the two are not 
distinct types of jurisdiction at all. Cf. Cullison, ¶¶ 2-3, 850 P.2d at 1081, 1083 (Opala, J. 
concurring) (listing three categories: “(1) appellate jurisdiction, (2) original jurisdiction and 
(3) superintending control,” and reasoning that “[p]rerogative writs do not translate into 
jurisdiction; they rather afford examples of personal commands that may be used in the 
exercise of this court’s cognizance.” (emphasis omitted))  
 32. See OKLA. CONST. art. 7, § 4. 
 33. See JAMES E. PFANDER, ONE SUPREME COURT 28 (2009); see also State ex rel. 
Freeling v. Kight, 1915 OK 772, ¶¶ 3-11, 152 P. 362, 363-64; Fourth Nat’l Bank, 79 N.W. at 
1087. 
 34. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES at *42; see also 1 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, 
A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 212 (A. L. Goodhart & H. G. Hanbury eds., 7th ed. 1971) 
(describing King’s Bench jurisdiction as “general and universal” and including “jurisdiction 
‘to examine and correct all and all manner of errors in fact and in law of all the judges and 
justices of the realm in their judgments, process, and proceedings’” (quoting EDWARD COKE, 
THE FOURTH PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 71 (1644)). 
 35. Kight, ¶ 15, 152 P. at 364 (citing State ex rel. Bayha v. Kan. City Court of Appeals, 
10 S.W. 855 (Mo. 1889); State ex rel. Whitesite v. Dist. Court of First Judicial Dist., 63 P. 
395 (Mont. 1900)).  
 36. OKLA. CONST. art. 7, § 4. 
 37. Dancy v. Owens, 1927 OK 203, ¶ 10, 258 P. 879, 881. 
 38. Id. ¶ 9, 258 P. at 881 (quoting OKLA. CONST. art. 7, § 1 (amended 1967)).  
 39. Id. ¶ 14, 258 P. at 882.  
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noted above, the 1967 amendment gave COCA constitutional recognition 
and added the provision for the supreme court to resolve jurisdictional 
conflicts. But the “superintending control” language was not changed in 
any significant way, and the sparse history of the amendment indicates no 
intent to clarify or change the relationship of the two courts, except for the 
conflict-resolving provision.40 Accordingly, the supreme court continued to 
cite with approval its pre-1967 analysis of the relationship.41  
Although the supreme court’s appellate jurisdiction is explicitly limited 
to civil cases, the constitution does not explicitly limit superintending-
control jurisdiction to civil cases. Taken in isolation, therefore, the supreme 
court would seem to be able to exercise its broad, King’s Bench-like control 
over COCA as a court inferior to the supreme court. It is easy to see, 
though, that such a view would essentially eliminate the exclusivity of 
COCA’s appellate jurisdiction, if COCA’s decisions were undercut by writs 
from the supreme court. Thus, the supreme court has recognized the need to 
“construe[] in harmony” its superintending-control jurisdiction with 
COCA’s exclusive jurisdiction in criminal cases.42 And in practice, as this 
article discusses, the supreme court until 2015 exercised superintending-
control jurisdiction over COCA only when necessary to resolve 
jurisdictional disputes—a power that the supreme court is now explicitly 
granted in the constitution.43 So the primary issue in boundary disputes—
regardless of whether appellate jurisdiction or superintending-control 
jurisdiction was invoked—has been whether the case is civil or criminal. 
II. The Development of the Jurisdictional Boundary 
Initially, after COCA came into existence, a period of defining and 
testing the jurisdictional boundaries occurred. Litigants were sometimes 
                                                                                                                 
 40. See 1967 Okla. Sess. Laws 698.  
 41. Carder v. Court of Criminal Appeals, 1978 OK 130, ¶¶ 10-24, 595 P.2d 416, 419-
20. The term “inferior courts” has been used in different ways. It is sometimes used to refer 
to courts of limited jurisdiction. See, e.g., Kempe’s Lessee v. Kennedy, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 
173, 185 (1809). In state constitutions, the term usually applies to rank. See, e.g., State ex 
rel. Harvey v. Medler, 142 P. 376, 378 (N.M. 1914) (“While it is true that the term ‘inferior 
court’ is usually applied to courts of limited or special jurisdiction, yet it is used in different 
senses, and frequently refers to relative rank and authority, and not to intrinsic quality. . . . It 
was in this sense, in our opinion, that the term inferior courts is used in our 
Constitution . . . .”). The use of the phrase “inferior to the Supreme Court” in Oklahoma’s 
constitution clearly indicates the second meaning.  
 42. Dutton v. City of Midwest City, 2015 OK 51, ¶ 33, 353 P.3d 532, 549. 
 43. See infra Section II.C.3. 
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uncertain about which court had jurisdiction. More often, litigants who 
were unsatisfied with the result in one court would seek a second opinion 
via habeas petitions, petitions for writs of prohibition, or writs of 
mandamus. Through this process, the courts began to delineate the 
boundary, although not entirely consistently. In fact, the supreme court has 
commented that the “dichotomous division of Oklahoma appeals into ‘civil’ 
and ‘criminal’ has never been perfectly airtight. Although case law 
expressions might reject the concept of ‘shared’ power over any class of 
appeals by clinging to ‘undivided’ and ‘exclusive’ jurisdiction in each class, 
the marketplace reality contradicts such notion.”44 Some of the history must 
be reviewed to understand where the boundary presently appears to exist 
and the policies and reasoning behind its placement. Further, some of these 
early cases occasionally find their way into modern opinions, so it is 
important to understand their origins. 
A. 1908-1927: A Period of Comity Concluding with a Jurisdictional Battle 
The early years were marked by a great deal of deference by both courts. 
Most issues arose via requests for writs, and usually the courts could look at 
the underlying case and decide whether the particular request was 
considered civil or criminal based on which court would have had 
jurisdiction over an appeal. For example, in Ex parte Fowler, one of the 
first COCA cases to address the jurisdictional boundary, the petitioner had 
been jailed for contempt in a civil case.45 COCA, apparently sua sponte, 
held that it had no jurisdiction.46 Because it would have had no jurisdiction 
over an appeal of the underlying civil action, the court reasoned that it also 
lacked jurisdiction over a habeas petition arising from the same action.47 
The court modestly announced that it had “no desire to intrude [its] views 
upon matters wholly within the authority of the Supreme Court.”48  
Similarly, the supreme court deferred to COCA in a petition for writ of 
prohibition alleging a double jeopardy violation.49 After COCA had denied 
a habeas petition based on the double jeopardy claim, the petitioner sought 
relief from the supreme court. The court noted that COCA had the power to 
                                                                                                                 
 44. Hale v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 1979 OK 158, ¶ 3 n.12, 603 P.2d 761, 763 (citations 
omitted). 
 45. 105 P. 180 (Okla. Crim. App. 1909). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 182.  
 48. Id. 
 49. Jeter v. Dist. Court of Tulsa Cty., 1922 OK 140, 206 P. 831. 
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issue a writ of mandamus in a criminal case, and that mandamus is “in the 
nature of appellate jurisdiction,” and thus held that it had no jurisdiction.50 
The court reasoned that the petition was an attempt to receive an advance 
determination of an issue that could be decided via appeal to COCA.51 The 
court also commented favorably that COCA’s declination of jurisdiction 
over civil contempt actions was support for the “sound logic” of its own 
restraint.52 
This deference extended to issues decided by COCA that arguably could 
have fallen under the supreme court’s superintending jurisdiction over 
inferior courts other than COCA. For example, in Herndon v. Hammond, 
the court considered whether municipal courts had jurisdiction over liquor 
ordinance violations.53 The defendant sought a writ of prohibition from the 
supreme court, but COCA had already decided the issue in another case.54 
The supreme court reasoned that because an appeal in the case would go to 
COCA and the subject matter of the case was exclusively criminal, the 
court “fe[lt] constrained to follow” COCA’s holding.55 Similarly, the 
supreme court deferred to COCA’s determination of jurisdiction between a 
county court and district court in a misdemeanor nepotism case, despite 
inconsistency with pre-COCA supreme court cases.56 The supreme court 
held that it would follow COCA’s decision regarding the lower courts’ 
jurisdiction over a criminal matter “since the enforcement of [criminal] 
statutes must be in accordance with such construction.”57  
Other issues of statutory construction were not as clearly civil or 
criminal, and in Flood v. State ex rel. Caldwell,58 the supreme court 
announced an important principle of comity for the construction of those 
“mixed” statutes. The issue was the constitutionality of one section of the 
Enforcing Act, Oklahoma’s liquor prohibition statute.59 The section 
                                                                                                                 
 50. Id. ¶ 9, 206 P. at 834 (citing Ex parte Crane, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 190 (1831)).  
 51. Id. ¶ 11, 206 P. at 834. 
 52. Id. 
 53. 1911 OK 159, 115 P. 775. 
 54. Ex parte Simmons, 1911 OK CR 14, 112 P. 951, overruled in part by Ex parte 
Johnson, 1917 OK CR 3, 161 P. 1097. 
 55. Herndon, ¶ 4, 115 P. at 776. 
 56. State ex rel. Ikard v. Russell, 1912 OK 425, 124 P. 1092. 
 57. Id. ¶ 1, 124 P. at 1093; see also Ex parte Buchanan, 1925 OK 676, 240 P. 699 (same 
regarding constitutionality of municipal criminal court); Ex parte Anderson, 1912 OK 437, 
124 P. 980 (same regarding constitutionality of county court jurisdiction). 
 58. 1911 OK 27, 113 P. 914. 
 59. Id. ¶ 1, 113 P. at 914. 
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empowered the governor to appoint counsel to enforce the act, in part by 
bringing actions to recover monetary penalties.60 In a criminal case, COCA 
had already held that the appointment provision was constitutional.61 In a 
one-paragraph opinion, the supreme court announced that it would follow 
COCA’s conclusion because even though the statute in question—the 
appointment provision—was “not a penal statute . . . . it has to do almost 
solely with the enforcement of such statutes.”62 Similarly, in State ex rel. 
Perkins v. Sneed, the supreme court followed COCA’s decision regarding 
the constitutionality of an act with civil and criminal provisions creating a 
real estate commission.63  
The supreme court first carved out a civil issue from a criminal case in 
Dunn v. State.64 The issue was the forfeiture of an appearance bond.65 After 
the defendant was late for his trial for the crime of perjury, the trial judge 
continued the trial but ordered the bond forfeited.66 The defendant moved to 
vacate the forfeiture and appealed the denial to the supreme court. The 
court decided that it had jurisdiction, reasoning that although COCA had 
exclusive jurisdiction in all criminal cases appealed from lower courts, 
“[t]he instant case . . . is not a criminal case. The judgment appealed from 
was not an adjudication of guilt, but was an adjudication that the principal 
had breached the condition of his bond, i.e., incurred a civil liability, and 
that he and his sureties were liable to the state.”67 The court reasoned that 
the bond forfeiture was “an independent proceeding of a civil nature.”68 
The court’s decision in Dunn was questionable, both as a matter of 
statutory construction, as well as a matter of policy. Both the constitution 
and the statute creating COCA provide exclusive jurisdiction in criminal 
cases.69 The perjury case was indisputably criminal. Focusing on the order 
being appealed rather than on the nature of the case served no purpose other 
than to blur the boundary between civil and criminal cases. Particularly 
considering that the purpose of the creation of COCA was to relieve the 
                                                                                                                 
 60. 1907-1908 Okla. Sess. Laws 612. 
 61. Childs v. State, 1910 OK CR 230, 113 P. 545. 
 62. Flood, ¶ 1, 113 P. at 914 (emphasis added). 
 63. 1930 OK 248, 287 P. 1021. 
 64. 1917 OK 269, 166 P. 193. 
 65. Id. ¶ 0, 166 P. at 193. 
 66. Id. ¶ 1, 166 P. at 193. 
 67. Id. ¶ 4, 166 P. at. 194 (emphasis added). 
 68. Id. ¶ 4, 166 P. at 195 (citing United States v. Dunne, 173 F. 254, 257 (9th Cir. 
1909)). 
 69. OKLA. CONST. art. 7, § 4; 20 OKLA. STAT. § 40 (2011). 
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supreme court of some its caseload, and considering that decisions 
regarding forfeiture of appearance bonds are fairly common case-
management decisions, the court’s decision to assume jurisdiction over this 
appeal seems unwise. Both COCA and the supreme court, however, have 
continued to follow this decision in forfeiture cases.70  
The first outright split between the courts involved a trial judge’s 
disqualification in a criminal case. In State v. Brown, COCA held that it had 
exclusive jurisdiction to decide the issue in a mandamus action.71 The State 
had sought to disqualify a trial court judge because of his “bias and 
prejudice in behalf of” a defendant charged with murder.72 The court noted 
its constitutional and statutory mandate and denied the writ on the merits.73 
Regarding its jurisdiction, the court strongly stated its claim and asserted a 
broad definition of exclusive jurisdiction:  
Exclusive jurisdiction cannot be divided, but must be confined 
solely and entirely to the court upon which it is conferred. 
Exclusive appellate jurisdiction of criminal cases means that this 
court alone has the power to review and correct any and all 
errors committed in criminal cases by the trial court. If any other 
court shares such power with this court, our jurisdiction would 
not be exclusive, and it would necessarily result in conflicts and 
confusion, and would thereby destroy the unified and 
harmonious enforcement of criminal law in Oklahoma.74 
Ten years later, the supreme court decided the same jurisdictional issue 
with a different result, basing its decision on the superintending-control 
jurisdiction given in the constitution. In Robertson v. Bozarth, a defendant 
charged with accepting a bribe filed a mandamus action in the supreme 
court, seeking the disqualification of the trial judge.75 The court determined 
that it had jurisdiction, basing that conclusion on some spurious 
reasoning.76 The court quoted the constitution, noting that its appellate 
                                                                                                                 
 70. See, e.g., Machell v. State, 1970 OK 207, 481 P.2d 148; Hargrove v. State ex rel. 
Dennis, 1964 OK CR 105, 396 P.2d 675. 
 71. 8 Okla. Crim. 40, 126 P. 245 (Okla. Crim. App. 1912). 
 72. Id. at 42, 126 P. at 246.  
 73. Id. at 41, 126 P. at 245.  
 74. Id. at 48, 126 P. at 249. 
 75. 1922 OK 288, 209 P. 742.  
 76. Id. ¶ 2, 209 P. at 742.  
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jurisdiction was limited to civil cases.77 The court then cited the statutory 
definition of a criminal case as “one prosecuted by the state as a party, 
against a person charged with a public offense, for the punishment thereof,” 
and the definition of a civil case as “every other.”78 The court then noted 
that, regarding original jurisdiction, it had superintending control over all 
inferior courts, with the power to issue, inter alia, writs of mandamus.79 
Because the petition for writ was an original action in the supreme court, 
the court deemed that to be the “case” at issue and was “forced to the 
conclusion” that it was a civil matter, being that the action in the supreme 
court was the petition for a writ, not the state prosecuting a defendant 
charged with an offense.80  
This reasoning took the Dunn analysis to another extreme, focusing on 
the writ being requested, rather than on the case from which the issue had 
arisen or even the particular issue being contested. The court disclaimed 
any interest in whether COCA would have had jurisdiction had the action 
been brought there initially, finding that “unnecessary to decide” because 
the supreme court had jurisdiction over the original action before it.81 The 
court did not even mention the exclusivity language of the constitution or 
the statute regarding appellate jurisdiction and thus made no attempt to 
harmonize the two.82 The court reached the same result in Heard v. 
Sullivan, again reasoning that the exclusivity of appellate jurisdiction was 
irrelevant because mandamus was within the court’s superintending control 
over the trial court.83 
Fortunately, the courts have never cited either Robertson or Heard for 
this jurisdictional analysis, and this line of reasoning is inconsistent with the 
courts’ present treatment of the issue. In fact, the Rules for District Courts 
promulgated by the supreme court specifically provide that original 
mandamus proceedings to disqualify a judge in a criminal case shall be 
                                                                                                                 
 77. Id. ¶ 2, 209 P. at 742-43. 
 78. Id. ¶ 11, 209 P. at 743 (quoting 12 OKLA. STAT. §§ 7-8 (repealed 1984)). 
 79. Id. ¶ 2, 209 P. at 742-43.  
 80. Id. ¶ 14, 209 P. at 743. As support, the court cited Marshall v. Sitton, 1918 OK 110, 
172 P. 964, where the supreme court affirmed mandamus in a criminal case where the 
district court had ordered the county court to change venue. The supreme court did not 
address its jurisdiction, even though the case was clearly criminal in nature. 
 81. Robertson, ¶ 16, 209 P. at 744. 
 82. Id.  
 83. 1955 OK 41, ¶ 3, 280 P.2d 708, 709. 
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brought in COCA, and that such cases “will be transferred to the proper 
court” if civil or criminal matters are sought in the wrong forum.84 
The relations of respectful deference came to a temporary halt in 1927, 
when an unusual set of circumstances resulted in a battle of competing 
orders from the two courts.85 The underlying case was a civil one.86 At one 
point in the proceedings, one of the litigants, Owens, filed a motion that the 
supreme court deemed to contain false statements, contemptuous of the 
court.87 The motion alleged that an opinion of the court had actually been 
written by the plaintiff’s counsel and that one justice was “under the control 
and direction” of another counsel.88 The supreme court found Owens in 
contempt and ordered twelve months imprisonment and a $5000 fine.89 
Within a few minutes of receipt of the contempt order, Owens filed a 
habeas application with COCA.90 COCA issued a show-cause order and 
ordered him released on bond.91 The supreme court then issued a writ of 
prohibition against COCA, prohibiting it from altering the supreme court’s 
final judgment.92 Owens then filed a new habeas petition with COCA, and 
the supreme court issued a new writ of prohibition.93 Despite the writ, 
COCA granted the habeas petition and discharged Owens from the 
judgment of the supreme court.94 In its opinion, COCA seemed to 
characterize the contempt as a criminal case because of the sanction that 
was issued: a sanction that the judges believed was excessive.95  
Unsurprisingly, the supreme court was not amused, reciting that COCA’s 
order was “127 typewritten pages” and that it would serve “no useful 
purpose to meander with the intemperate and rude statements found 
                                                                                                                 
 84. OKLA. DIST. CT. R. 15(b). 
 85. Dancy v. Owens, 1927 OK 203, 258 P. 879. 
 86. Id. ¶ 24, 258 P. at 884.  
 87. See Ex parte Owens, 37 Okla. Crim. 118, 258 P. 758 (Okla. Crim. App. 1927), 
vacated, Dancy, ¶ 41, 258 P. at 887. 
 88. State ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Davenport, 1927 OK 137, ¶ 7, 256 P. 340, 350 (quoting 
Ex parte Owens, 37 Okla. Crim. at 149, 258 P. at 770). 
 89. Id. ¶ 8, 256 P. at 350-51. 
 90. Id. ¶ 2, 256 P. at 341-42. 
 91. Id.  
 92. Id.  
 93. Id. 
 94. Ex parte Owens, 37 Okla. Crim. 118, 204, 258 P. 758, 786 (Okla. Crim. App. 1927), 
vacated, Dancy, ¶ 41, 258 P. at 887.  
 95. Id. at 277, 258 P. at 810-11. 
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therein.”96 For the first time, the court granted a writ of certiorari and held 
that COCA had acted beyond the bounds of its jurisdiction.97 The court 
recited articles 1 and 2 of the original constitution, using those articles to 
establish the proposition that COCA was an “inferior” court because it was 
established by the legislature, and thus was subject to the supreme court’s 
superintending control.98 Although COCA has appellate jurisdiction in a 
criminal case, the court focused on the habeas petition as an original action 
in COCA.99 The action was not an appeal, because it was not brought from 
a lower court to correct an error. And the underlying issue was contempt in 
a civil case, clearly outside the definition of a criminal case. Relying on 
United States Supreme Court precedent, the court reasoned that contempt is 
sui generis, within the power of each court, and is not a criminal case 
merely because of the sanction.100 The court closed its opinion with a 
slightly veiled threat of more serious consequences should COCA continue 
to entertain habeas petitions in the case.101  
B. 1927-2010: Deference with Exceptions 
For the most part, the courts stayed free of conflict after Dancy, and a 
spirit of comity again prevailed throughout the rest of the courts’ first 
hundred years. For example, in Hall v. Welch, the supreme court declined 
jurisdiction of an appeal on the issue of whether testimony was compelled 
and thus the basis of immunity from prosecution.102 In Ex parte Meek, the 
court declined to declare a securities statute unconstitutional under the 
United States Constitution where COCA had already ruled on the issue.103 
Interestingly, the court stated that it indeed had the right to declare criminal 
provisions in violation of the United States Constitution, but it declined to 
                                                                                                                 
 96. Dancy, ¶ 3, 258 P. at 881.  
 97. Id. ¶¶ 28, 40, 258 P. at 885, 886. 
 98. Id. ¶ 10, 258 P. at 881. 
 99. Id. ¶¶ 22-23, 258 P. at 884.  
 100. Id. ¶¶ 33-34, 258 P. at 885-86. 
 101. Id. ¶ 42, 258 P. at 887 (“If more stringent means are necessary to keep the Criminal 
Court of Appeals within the legislative authority granted it, such means are adequate, and if 
necessary, will be used, however reluctant this court may be, if such necessity is brought 
about by that court.”) 
 102. 1931 OK 548, 3 P.2d 232. 
 103. 1933 OK 473, 25 P.2d 54.  
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exercise that right because of its policy to avoid jurisdictional conflicts with 
COCA when possible.104 
Despite this spirit of comity, issues of boundary location occasionally 
arose during this period. But the issues were always resolved peacefully, 
without competing orders from the two courts. Three notable areas of line 
drawing have relevance to the modern jurisdictional disputes: (1) 
ambiguous jurisdictional statutes,105 (2) carve-outs from criminal cases for 
“institutional deficiency”106 claims, and (3) issues regarding punishment in 
criminal cases.107  
1. Jurisdictional Conflicts Created by Statute 
Occasionally, statutes have created jurisdictional conflicts, either because 
of ambiguity or somewhat conflicting provisions. Carder v. Court of 
Criminal Appeals,108 the case where the supreme court noted the break from 
fifty years of jurisdictional peace, involved a statute providing appellate 
jurisdiction in juvenile cases.109 In an unusual set of facts, a juvenile court 
judge had entered an order finding the juvenile a delinquent child and a 
ward of the court, and placing him in the custody of the State.110 The boy’s 
father sought a return of custody after allegations that the boy had been 
abused in the state school where he was placed.111 Upon application by the 
State, COCA granted a writ prohibiting the juvenile court from hearing the 
change-of-custody motion.112 Barred from conducting the hearing, the 
juvenile court instead dismissed the case against the juvenile, thus freeing 
him from the State’s custody.113 COCA granted mandamus against the 
judge, directing him to vacate the order.114  
                                                                                                                 
 104. Id. ¶ 11, 25 P.2d at 56. The court offered no authority for such a right, and that claim 
is inconsistent with the change to the statute removing the exception for Constitutional 
claims. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.  
 105. See In re M.B., 2006 OK 63, ¶¶ 8, 13, 145 P.3d 1040, 1044, 1047.  
 106. Dutton v. City of Midwest City, 2015 OK 51, ¶ 23, 353 P.3d 532, 543. 
 107. State ex rel. Henry v. Mahler, 1990 OK 3, ¶ 15, 786 P.2d 82, 86.  
 108. 1978 OK 130, 595 P.2d 416. 
 109. Id. ¶¶ 14-17, 595 P.2d at 419-20 (citing 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1123 (1971) (current 
version at 10A OKLA. STAT. § 1-5-101 (2011)). 
 110. Id. ¶ 4, 595 P.2d at 418. 
 111. Id. ¶ 5, 595 P.2d at 418.  
 112. State ex rel. Dep’t of Insts., Soc. & Rehab. Servs. v. Maley, 1977 OK CR 299, ¶¶ 3-
4, 569 P.2d 1020, 1021.  
 113. Id. ¶ 6, 569 P.2d at 1021. 
 114. Id.  
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Petitioners, the juvenile and his father, then asked the supreme court for 
a writ of prohibition against COCA, contending that COCA had exceeded 
its jurisdiction.115 The supreme court agreed, vacating COCA’s order.116 
The court noted COCA’s power to issue writs in aid of its jurisdiction but 
held that COCA had no jurisdiction because the order could not have been 
appealed to COCA.117 The supreme court’s decision rested on a very strict 
interpretation of the jurisdictional statute. The statute regarding juvenile 
cases provided that appeals from orders in juvenile cases were to the 
supreme court, except that “appeals taken from a trial court's decision in a 
proceeding for an adjudication of juvenile delinquency or in a proceeding 
certifying a juvenile to stand trial as an adult or denying such certification 
shall be taken to the Court of Criminal Appeals.”118 The supreme court 
reasoned that the order dismissing the case was a post-dispositional order—
not an adjudication of juvenile delinquency—and as such did not fall within 
the statutory exceptions.119  
This interpretation was not entirely without support: juvenile 
delinquency had already been adjudicated, so the dismissal was not a 
proceeding for adjudication. On the other hand, the juvenile court retained 
jurisdiction after the adjudication, so COCA’s broader interpretation of 
“proceeding” was also defensible because dismissal of the entire case was 
arguably part of the same “proceeding.” At least plausibly, this was a case 
of the supreme court strictly interpreting the statute to assume jurisdiction 
only because the court thought that COCA’s decision on the merits was 
clearly wrong. COCA had upheld the State’s contention that once a child 
was adjudged delinquent and placed in state custody, the State assumed the 
role of parent and the child was beyond the jurisdiction of the juvenile 
court. The supreme court found this reasoning contrary to statute and public 
policy, so it intervened to protect the juvenile court’s role in supervising 
delinquent children as wards of the court.120  
 Procedurally, the court proceeded carefully because it wanted to resolve 
the jurisdictional conflict in the manner “least disruptive to our appellate 
                                                                                                                 
 115. Carder, ¶ 2, 595 P.2d at 418. 
 116. Id. ¶ 40, 595 P.2d at 422. 
 117. Id. ¶ 16, 595 P.2d at 420. 
 118. Id. ¶ 14, 595 P.2d at 419 (emphasis added) (citing 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1123 (1971) 
(current version at 10A OKLA. STAT. § 1-5-101 (2011)). 
 119. Id. ¶¶ 15-16, 595 P.2d at 419-20. 
 120. Id. ¶ 31, 595 P.2d at 421. 
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process.”121 Noting that “[t]here is no appeal or proceeding in error from 
the Court of Criminal Appeals to this Court,” the court recast the action as a 
proceeding for certiorari rather than prohibition.122 The court recited its 
constitutional power to grant writs of certiorari, resolved the issue on the 
merits, and ended the litigation.123 Because the court determined that 
COCA had acted outside its jurisdiction, this manner of proceeding was 
clearly correct under the supreme court’s constitutional power to determine 
which court has jurisdiction. Even without this specific constitutional 
power, this would have been a valid exercise of the supreme court’s 
superintending power to ensure that inferior courts are acting within their 
jurisdiction.124  
Comparatively, statutory jurisdictional issues regarding grand juries have 
been resolved amicably, with extreme deference and expressions of respect 
between the two courts. Statutes provide for supreme court jurisdiction to 
convene a multicounty grand jury,125 but any matters not specifically 
covered by the multicounty grand jury statutes are subject to the grand jury 
statutes.126 Thus, appeals regarding criminal-type issues would fall under 
COCA’s criminal jurisdiction.127 For example, in Movants to Quash Grand 
Jury Subpoenas Issued in Multicounty Grand Jury v. Powers, COCA issued 
a stay of grand jury subpoenas and referred the matter to the supreme court 
for decision.128 The court decided the First Amendment claim to quash 
investigative subpoenas and decided issues regarding the relative powers of 
the Ethics Commission and the grand jury.129 The court also announced that 
future grand jury issues would be resolved on an issue-by-issue basis 
                                                                                                                 
 121. Id. ¶ 19, 595 P.2d at 420. 
 122. Id. ¶ 20, 595 P.2d at 420. 
 123. Id. ¶¶ 29-40, 595 P.2d at 421-22. 
 124. For an example of the supreme court using its superintending power without a 
jurisdictional boundary conflict, see Jackson v. Freeman, 1995 OK 100, 905 P.2d 217. In 
Jackson, a defendant’s conviction had been affirmed by a panel of the Emergency Appellate 
Division of COCA. Id. ¶ 0, 905 P.2d at 217. The defendant contended that the panel—
authorized by the legislature and comprised of non-COCA judges appointed by the Chief 
Justice of the supreme court—was unconstitutional. Id. The court recast the defendant’s quo 
warranto petition as a request for prohibition and held that it had jurisdiction to decide the 
request, citing Carder. Id. ¶¶ 8-9, 905 P.2d at 219-20.  
 125. 22 OKLA. STAT. § 351 (2011). 
 126. Id. § 350. 
 127. OKLA. CONST. art. 7, § 4. 
 128. 1992 OK 142, ¶ 1, 839 P.2d 655. 
 129. Id. ¶¶ 5-10, 839 P.2d at 656-57. 
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because this grand jury was addressing some non-criminal issues regarding 
removal of persons from office.130 Later, when an issue concerning secrecy 
of testimony arose regarding the same grand jury, the parties filed separate 
mandamus petitions in each court. The supreme court consolidated the 
cases and transferred them to COCA.131 In holding that witness-immunity 
hearings must be closed to the public, COCA was careful to avoid 
conflict.132 As part of its analysis, the court noted that “[b]ecause of such 
dual jurisdiction over grand jury matters, it is important that the two courts 
do not take conflicting positions concerning grand jury secrecy. We do not 
find that our position requiring secrecy of grand jury proceedings is in 
conflict with positions taken by the Oklahoma Supreme Court.”133 
Similarly, in Movants to Quash Multicounty Grand Jury Subpoena v. 
Dixon, COCA referred to the supreme court the issue of whether a 
multicounty grand jury lacks jurisdiction to investigate crimes alleged to 
have occurred in only one county.134 Because the issue involved “a 
generalized analysis of constitutional and statutory norms,” the supreme 
court retained jurisdiction.135 And in a similar show of deference, the 
supreme court transferred a grand jury matter to COCA.136 In Woolverton v. 
Multi-County Grand Jury, the petitioners had filed an original action in the 
supreme court, seeking a writ of prohibition regarding a multicounty grand 
jury's subpoena for fingerprints, palm prints, and blood samples.137 Because 
the issue involved constitutional issues of the grand jury's authority “to 
conduct discovery in the form of a bodily search as part of a criminal 
investigation,” the supreme court reasoned that the case was within 
COCA’s jurisdiction and transferred it.138 
Thus, in these and other cases where statutes contained or created 
jurisdictional ambiguity, the courts have worked well together. The 
supreme court has resolved the ambiguities via its constitutional power to 
                                                                                                                 
 130. Id. ¶ 2, 839 P.2d at 656. 
 131. Griffin Television v. Powers (In re Proceedings of Multicounty Grand Jury), 1993 
OK CR 12, ¶ 2, 847 P.2d 812, 813. 
 132. Id. ¶ 3, 847 P.2d at 813.  
 133. Id. ¶ 12, 847 P.2d at 815. 
 134. 2008 OK 36, ¶ 0, 184 P.3d 546. 
 135. Id. ¶ 11, 184 P.3d at 549. 
 136. Id. ¶ 10, 184 P.3d at 549.  
 137. 1993 OK CR 42, ¶¶ 1-2, 859 P.2d 1112, 1113. 
 138. Dixon, ¶ 10, 184 P.3d at 549. 
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determine which court has jurisdiction, and COCA has accepted the 
decisions without incident.139  
2. Attorney Fees in Criminal Cases: “Institutional Deficiencies” 
In 1977, the supreme court carved out another jurisdictional area in 
Sanders v. Followell,140 which it has since referred to as civil jurisdiction 
over claims of “institutional deficiencies” or “the proper functioning of a 
governmental entity.”141 The issue in Sanders was construction of the 
statute providing a fee to appointed counsel in death penalty cases.142 The 
attorneys petitioned for a writ of mandamus to compel the trial judge to 
award the statutory fee for each of three defendants represented, rather than 
one fee per case.143 Without addressing any jurisdictional issue vis-à-vis 
COCA—presumably because no such issue was raised—the court granted 
the writ.144 The court did address the propriety of mandamus, reasoning that 
the matter was “publici juris[] and of immediate concern to the orderly 
administration of justice,” but it did not consider whether the case may have 
been within COCA’s jurisdiction.145 
In fact, supreme court jurisdiction in such a case was not at all obvious. 
The issue of payment of counsel in death cases can arise only in criminal 
cases. COCA has exclusive appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases, and the 
supreme court has previously stated that mandamus is in the nature of 
appellate jurisdiction.146 And although publici juris is sometimes cited as an 
independent basis for jurisdiction,147 whether the matter was indeed publici 
                                                                                                                 
 139. See Hale v. Bd. Of Cty. Comm’rs, 1979 OK 158, 603 P.2d 761 (After COCA 
rejected a sheriff’s appeal of his ouster, the supreme court treated the appeal as a civil appeal 
transferred by COCA. Although the ouster proceeding was conducted as a misdemeanor trial 
as required by statute, the proceeding was civil because it results in no criminal 
punishment.); see also Courtney v. State, 2013 OK 64, 307 P.3d 337 (holding, after the 
defendant appealed to both courts, that the supreme court had jurisdiction to decide the 
appeal regarding a claim of actual innocence under the Governmental Tort Claims Act, even 
though the defendant’s request to the trial court had been made as part of his post-conviction 
proceeding). 
 140. 1977 OK 143, 567 P.2d 84. 
 141. Dutton v. City of Midwest City, 2015 OK 51, ¶ 23, 353 P.3d 532, 543. 
 142. Sanders, ¶ 4, 567 P.2d at 85. 
 143. Id. ¶ 1, 567 P.2d at 85.  
 144. Id. ¶ 6, 567 P.2d at 86.  
 145. Id. 
 146. Jeter v. Dist. Court of Tulsa Cty., 1922 OK 140, ¶ 9, 206 P. 831, 833-34 (citing Ex 
parte Crane, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 190 (1831)).  
 147. See, e.g., Naylor v. Petuskey, 1992 OK 88, ¶ 1, 834 P.2d 439, 440. 
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juris under a broad definition of the term was not relevant to whether the 
matter was civil or criminal.148 Assuming jurisdiction was consistent with 
the court’s taking jurisdiction over bond forfeiture in Dunn v. State.149 This 
again focuses on the order being appealed rather than the nature of the case. 
And at first blush, carving out this exception serves no obvious purpose and 
could have been left to COCA. On the other hand, construction of the 
attorney fee statute has no relationship to the guilt or punishment of the 
defendant, the usual subjects of appeals in criminal cases. Furthermore, the 
maximum amount of the attorney fee is somewhat linked to the supreme 
court’s function of regulating the practice of law.150 But all things 
considered, the decision seems to unnecessarily intrude on COCA’s 
jurisdiction. 
This link to regulating the practice of law is more apparent in State v. 
Lynch, where the supreme court assumed jurisdiction of an appeal 
regarding payment of court-appointed attorneys in capital crime cases.151 
The trial court had held that the statutory limit on attorney fees was 
unconstitutional and awarded the attorneys a fee based on an hourly rate. 
(The appeal was consolidated with an original jurisdiction request from 
three county bar associations dealing with the same issue.)152 The court 
affirmed the attorney fees award, with slight modifications, and announced 
guidelines and procedures for courts to follow until the legislature acted to 
fill the void created by the unconstitutionality of the statute.153 The court 
relied on its superintending-control jurisdiction, its managerial and 
administrative authority over the district courts, and its “direct and inherent 
constitutional power to regulate the practice of law.”154 
In Lynch, the supreme court ignored the possibility that COCA had 
jurisdiction. But its assumption of jurisdiction was better grounded than in 
Sanders. The court noted that the same issue arose in civil guardianship 
                                                                                                                 
 148. Cf. Keating v. Johnson, 1996 OK 61, ¶ 4, 918 P.2d 51, 61 (Simms, J., concurring) 
(“[I]t should be remembered that the doctrine of publici juris is not a ground of jurisdiction 
in itself. It is merely one factor a court may consider in deciding whether to assume original 
jurisdiction when such jurisdiction already exists on proper grounds.”) 
 149. 1917 OK 269, 166 P. 193; see supra text accompanying notes 63-69.  
 150. Cf. State v. Lynch, 1990 OK 82, ¶ 27, 796 P.2d 1150, 1162-63; In re Integration of 
State Bar, 1939 OK 378, 95 P.2d 113. 
 151. 1990 OK 82, ¶ 0, 796 P.2d 1150, 1152. 
 152. Id. ¶¶ 0-1, 796 P.2d at 1152-53. 
 153. Id. ¶¶ 21-24, 796 P.2d at 1161-62. 
 154. Id. ¶¶ 26-28, 796 P.2d at 1162-63 (footnote omitted) (citing OKLA. CONST. art. 7, §§ 
4, 6). 
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proceedings.155 So the need for consistency among all court-appointment 
cases combined with the court’s duty to regulate the practice of law provide 
a firmer justification for supreme court jurisdiction.  
3. Issues Regarding Punishment in Criminal Cases 
One important development during this period was the supreme court’s 
analysis of the jurisdictional aspects of issues regarding punishment in 
criminal cases, an analysis that resulted in complete jurisdictional deference 
to COCA. In Hinkle v. Kenny, the supreme court denied a writ of 
mandamus on an issue of statutory construction regarding whether 
particular sentences should run consecutively or concurrently.156 In holding 
that COCA’s decision regarding construction of penal statutes should be 
followed,157 the court impliedly (and wisely) abandoned its pronouncement 
in Robertson that mandamus was a civil matter that gave rise to supreme 
court jurisdiction, either solely or concurrently with COCA.158 In Hinkle, 
the petitioner specifically argued that mandamus was a civil matter, as 
opposed to a habeas petition which would be essentially criminal when the 
underlying case was criminal.159 The court found the distinction 
unpersuasive. More importantly, the opinion shows that the supreme court 
considered sentencing statutes to be within the jurisdictional realm of 
COCA, just as previous issues regarding other statutes that the court 
deemed predominantly criminal. 
Issues regarding implementation of the sentence of a criminal defendant 
were also held to be within the jurisdiction of COCA. In State ex rel. Henry 
v. Mahler, the court addressed how an amendment to the earned credit 
statute applied to prior crimes.160 COCA, in a somewhat surprising refusal 
to assume jurisdiction, held that it lacked jurisdiction because the question 
was an administrative decision for the Department of Corrections, not a 
proper subject of the Post-Conviction Procedure Act.161 The supreme court, 
exercising its constitutional power to resolve jurisdictional conflicts, denied 
the requested relief of prohibition or certiorari and held that COCA should 
                                                                                                                 
 155. Id. ¶ 5, 796 P.2d at 1155. 
 156. 1936 OK 582, ¶¶ 1-4, 13, 62 P.2d 621, 621-22, 623. 
 157. Id. ¶ 12, 62 P.2d at 622-23. 
 158. See Robertson v. Bozarth, 1922 OK 288, ¶¶ 12-14, 209 P. 742, 743. 
 159. Hinkle, ¶ 12, 62 P.2d at 622. 
 160. 1990 OK 3, ¶¶ 1-2, 786 P.2d 82, 83. 
 161. Mahler v. State, 1989 OK CR 62, ¶ 2, 781 P.2d 835, 835-36, modified, 1989 OK CR 
82, 783 P.2d 973. 
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have decided the question.162 The court reasoned that matters regarding 
punishment and release are “clearly” within the jurisdiction of COCA, 
quoting with approval a statement from a COCA opinion that an “essential 
part of the judgment is the punishment and the amount thereof.”163 
Similarly, Smith v. Oklahoma Department of Corrections addressed the 
issue of whether the Department of Corrections unlawfully supervising 
defendants past the two-year statutory period was criminal in nature.164 
After the trial court dismissed a civil suit regarding the claims, the supreme 
court transferred the appeal to COCA.165 A separate claim for supervision 
fees was civil but required resolution of the criminal issue first.166 And in 
the same vein, the supreme court referred to COCA an issue of whether a 
juvenile court could extend jurisdiction over a youthful offender until age 
twenty.167 Finding the statute silent as to appellate jurisdiction, the court 
reasoned that the case was criminal because the youthful offender was 
charged with a crime, the procedure was similar to that of a criminal trial, 
and the punishment available was identical to adult punishment except for a 
maximum sentence.168  
Finally, the supreme court applied this reasoning to a civil rights action 
challenging an execution on grounds that the defendants had interfered with 
the attorney-client relationship and deprived the plaintiff of access to the 
courts.169 In Maynard v. Layden, a COCA opinion, the court noted that the 
supreme court had held that it had no jurisdiction to enjoin an execution 
because the issue was one of punishment.170 COCA then prohibited the 
district court from enjoining the execution.171  
  
                                                                                                                 
 162. Henry, ¶¶ 15-20, 786 P.2d at 86-87. 
 163. Id. ¶ 15, 786 P.2d at 86 (quoting Ex parte Rice, 1930 OK 279, 289 P. 360). 
 164. 2001 OK 95, ¶ 3, 37 P.3d 872, 873. 
 165. Id. ¶¶ 5, 11, 37 P.3d at 873, 874. 
 166. Id. ¶ 10, 37 P.3d at 874. 
 167. In re M.B., 2006 OK 63, ¶ 1, 145 P.3d 1040, 1041. 
 168. Id. ¶¶ 13-14, 145 P.3d at 1047. 
 169. See Maynard v. Layden, 1992 OK CR 31, ¶ 3, 830 P.2d 581, 582. Though the 
original supreme court order in Maynard is no longer available, Justice Taylor referred to the 
precedent as recently as 2014. See Lockett III, 2014 OK 33, 356 P.3d 58, 61-62 (Taylor, J., 
dissenting). 
 170. Maynard, ¶ 3, 830 P.2d at 582. 
 171. Id. ¶ 10, 830 P.2d at 583. 
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C. 2011-2016: A Departure from Comity 
Although not rising to the same level of conflict, cases in the past five 
years have given rise to acrimony between the two courts not seen since 
Dancy. The supreme court has issued orders in three criminal cases, 
including stays of the proceedings in two of the cases. These encroachments 
are not easily explained by previous line-drawing cases, and in some 
respects seem flatly inconsistent with them.  
1. Leftwich v. Court of Criminal Appeals 
Leftwich v. Court of Criminal Appeals172 was the first case since 
Dancy173 in 1927 where the two courts issued somewhat conflicting 
statements about their jurisdiction in back-and-forth orders. Like Carder174 
in 1977, the last time the supreme court overrode a jurisdictional 
determination of COCA, the statements arose in a case where the supreme 
court obviously disagreed with COCA’s decision on the merits. Leftwich 
was a state legislator charged with a felony for soliciting or accepting an 
offer of a state job to be created in exchange for her agreement to withdraw 
as a candidate for re-election.175 She moved to dismiss the charges on 
various grounds, including immunity from prosecution under the Oklahoma 
Constitution’s speech or debate clause.176 When the motions were denied, 
she filed a petition with COCA for mandamus or prohibition.177 COCA 
denied the petition on multiple grounds, but COCA’s order included the 
following statement: “The Speech and Debate Clause in the Oklahoma 
Constitution includes an express exception for felonies.”178  
That statement was incorrect. The Oklahoma Constitution’s speech or 
debate clause is almost identical to the clause in the United States 
Constitution.179 And the United States Constitution’s exception for felonies 
                                                                                                                 
 172. (Leftwich I), 2011 OK 80, 262 P.3d 750 (Mem.). 
 173. See text accompanying notes 77-88. 
 174. See text accompanying notes 93-108. 
 175. Leftwich I, ¶ 2, 262 P.3d at 751 (Watt, J., dissenting). 
 176. Order Denying Petition for Writ of Prohibition and in the Alternative Petition for 
Writ of Mandamus at 1-2, Leftwich v. Alcorn, No. PR-2011-319 (Okla. Crim. App. June 9, 
2011). 
 177. Id. at 1.  
 178. Id. at 3. 
 179. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (“The Senators and Representatives . . . . shall 
in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest . . . ; 
and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other 
Place.”) with OKLA. CONST. art. 5, § 22 (“Senators and Representatives shall, except for 
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applies to the privilege from arrest, not the privilege for speech or debate.180 
So Leftwich moved to the supreme court, filing a petition for prohibition, 
mandamus, or declaratory relief.181 She did not seek any relief on the merits 
of her case—only a declaration that COCA’s statement regarding a felony 
exception was legally incorrect.182 She pointed to prior supreme court 
decisions holding that the Oklahoma speech or debate clause provides “at 
least as much protection" as the immunity granted by the comparable 
provisions of the Federal Constitution, and thus cast the statements as a 
direct conflict between the two courts.183 The supreme court issued a stay in 
the trial court and heard oral argument.184 At the oral argument, all counsel 
agreed that COCA’s interpretation of the clause “should not be enforced as 
the parties perceive that portion of the order to be a mistake of law.”185 
Based on counsel’s agreement and the court’s own review of the matter, the 
court announced in a brief order that it declined to assume jurisdiction in 
order to allow the parties to return to COCA and seek relief.186 The court 
also dissolved its stay.187 
When Leftwich returned to COCA, COCA declined to assume 
jurisdiction—on procedural grounds. Finding that Leftwich essentially 
sought a rehearing of the order declining to issue the writ, the court held 
                                                                                                                 
treason, felony, or breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during the session of the 
Legislature, and in going to and returning from the same, and, for any speech or debate in 
either House, shall not be questioned in any other place.”). 
 180. See generally RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE §§ 8.8(a), 8.9(a) (4th ed. 2007). The 
COCA order may have been referring to the entirety of section 22 as the “Speech and Debate 
Clause,” but such a reference would have been inapplicable for two reasons. First, Leftwich 
was not seeking to avoid arrest. Second, the privilege from arrest has been interpreted to 
apply only to civil cases and is now considered obsolete. Id. § 8.9(a).  
 181. Leftwich I, 2011 OK 80, ¶ 1, 262 P.3d 750, 750 (Mem.). 
 182. Application to Assume Original Jurisdiction and Petition for Writ of Prohibition 
and/or Mandamus, or in the Alternative, Declaratory Relief at 10, Leftwich I, 2011 OK 80, 
262 P.3d 750 (No. 109609). 
 183. Id. at 9; see, e.g., Brock v. Thompson, 1997 OK 127, ¶ 14, 948 P.2d 279, 287 (“The 
Speech or Debate Clause of the Oklahoma Constitution, Art. 5, § 22, absolutely protects 
legislators from suit calling for judicial inquiry into their performance 'within the sphere of 
legitimate legislative activity.'")(citations omitted). 
 184. Leftwich I, ¶¶ 2-4, 262 P.3d at 750-51. 
 185. Id. ¶ 2, 262 P.3d at 750.  
 186. Id. ¶ 3, 262 P.3d at 750. 
 187. Id. ¶ 4, 262 P.3d at 751. 
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that its rules did not provide for such a rehearing.188 Further, the new 
application was time-barred under the court’s rules.189 Finally, COCA 
disagreed that its previous statement was a mistake of law, stating that the 
speech or debate clause indeed includes an exception for felonies.190 (A 
concurring opinion defended COCA’s original order but instead focused on 
the question of whether the conduct was merely related to legislative affairs 
or was part of the legislative process, an issue that required further fact-
finding at the trial-court level.)191 
Ultimately, Leftwich agreed to a bench trial and was found guilty, 
reserving only the issue of whether she was a candidate for office, as 
required by the elements of the crime charged.192 Her conviction was 
affirmed, so COCA never addressed speech or debate issues again.193 The 
case is instructive regarding the jurisdictional boundary, however, because 
statements in the opinions indicate each court’s view, or in some cases each 
justice’s or judge’s view, of the relationship. The supreme court’s majority 
opinion stated that the court did not need to address its “supervisory writ 
jurisdiction over the Court of Criminal Appeals.”194 In other words, the 
majority recognized the possibility of exercising superintending jurisdiction 
over COCA as an inferior court but did not reach the issue of whether this 
was an appropriate case. Two justices dissented, advocating to assume 
jurisdiction and dismiss the entire criminal case.195 Regarding jurisdiction, 
the dissenting justices considered the criminal nature of the case as 
irrelevant, reasoning that the supreme court had constitutional power to 
prohibit the district attorney from acting in excess of his authority.196 Only 
one justice, in a concurrence, wanted to dismiss the petition for lack of 
jurisdiction because of COCA’s exclusive jurisdiction in criminal 
matters.197 
The COCA majority opinion did not address its jurisdiction vis-à-vis the 
supreme court, because it declined jurisdiction based on its own rules. But 
                                                                                                                 
 188. Leftwich v. Alcorn (Leftwich II), 2011 OK CR 27, ¶¶ 3-4, 262 P.3d 770, 771. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. ¶ 5, 262 P.3d at 771. 
 191. Id. ¶¶ 1-14, 262 P.3d at 772-76 (Johnson, J., concurring). 
 192. Leftwich v. State (Leftwich III), 2015 OK CR 5, ¶ 1, 350 P.3d 149, 151. 
 193. Id. ¶ 44, 350 P.3d at 162. 
 194. Leftwich I, 2011 OK 80, ¶ 3, 262 P.3d 750, 750 (Mem.). 
 195. Id. ¶ 1, 262 P.3d at 751 (Watt, J., dissenting); id. ¶¶ 13, 23, 262 P.3d at 754, 757 
(Reif, J., dissenting).  
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. ¶ 7, 262 P.3d at 751 (Winchester, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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in a concurrence to the second COCA order, one judge quoted the statement 
regarding superintending jurisdiction from the supreme court’s majority 
opinion, and “[t]o avoid any confusion . . . remind[ed] the parties that . . . 
this Court exercises exclusive appellate and writ jurisdiction in all criminal 
cases.”198 This statement seems to imply that its author does not believe that 
the supreme court has any type of jurisdiction over COCA in a criminal 
case. Thus, leading up to Lockett, differences of opinion were apparent 
regarding the relationship between the two courts.199 
2. Lockett v. State 
Lockett began as a declaratory judgment action in the Oklahoma County 
District Court. The plaintiffs, prisoners awaiting execution, sought a 
declaration that title 22, section 1015(B)—the statute providing procedures 
for executions—was unconstitutional.200 The plaintiffs contended that the 
statute’s secrecy provisions—preventing discovery of the identity of the 
suppliers of lethal drugs—denied them access to the courts.201 They also 
sought an order enjoining enforcement of the statute and enjoining their 
executions.202 After the defendants sought to remove the case to federal 
court,203 and the plaintiffs amended their complaint,204 the district court 
initially denied the request for a temporary order and injunction, reasoning 
that COCA had jurisdiction over the issues.205 The plaintiffs appealed that 
decision to the supreme court and requested a stay of their executions.206 
The supreme court remanded the case (what it called the “civil claims”) to 
the district court, with the exception of the stay request, which it transferred 
                                                                                                                 
 198. Leftwich II, 2011 OK CR 27, ¶ 4 n.2, 262 P.3d 770, 773 n.2 (Smith, J., concurring). 
 199. See generally 5 HARVEY D. ELLIS, JR. & CLYDE A. MUCHMORE, OKLAHOMA 
APPELLATE PRACTICE § 1.9 (2014-2015 ed. 2014) (discussing Leftwich and describing the 
“contours of the jurisdictional boundary” as “nebulous”). 
 200. Petition for Declaratory Relief and Request for Injunction at 3, Lockett v. Evans, 
No. CV-2014-330 (Dist. Ct. Okla. Cty. Feb. 26, 2014). 
 201. Id. at 22.  
 202. Id. 
 203. Notice of Removal of Civil Action, Lockett v. Evans, No. CV-2014-330 (Dist. Ct. 
Okla. Cty. Mar. 4, 2014). 
 204. Amended Petition for Declaratory Relief and Request for Injunction, Lockett v. 
Evans, No. CV-14-330, 2014 WL 6879907 (Dist. Ct. Okla. Cty. Mar. 7, 2014). 
 205. Lockett v. Evans, No. CV-2014-330, 2014 WL 6809101, at *1 (Dist. Ct. Okla. Cty. 
Mar. 11, 2014). 
 206. Lockett III, 2014 OK 33, ¶ 4, 356 P.3d 58, 59 (per curiam) (Mem.).  
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to COCA.207 COCA dismissed the stay request as moot because the State 
advised that it lacked the drugs required for the execution.208  
The district court then held that the secrecy provision of the statute was 
unconstitutional,209 which the State appealed to the supreme court.210 
Armed with the district court’s order, the plaintiffs again sought a stay from 
COCA.211 COCA again denied the stay, relying on the statute that sets the 
deadlines for carrying out executions.212 That statute also provides that 
COCA may stay execution dates under certain circumstances, specifically 
under subsection (C), when “an action challenging the conviction or 
sentence of death is pending before it.”213 Subsections (D), (E), and (F) 
provide for setting new execution dates if “any state or federal court” issues 
a stay that is later dissolved or vacated.214 COCA reasoned that because 
there was no pending action before COCA under Oklahoma statute title 22, 
section 1001.1(C), the court lacked power to issue a stay.215  
At that point, the supreme court again retained jurisdiction over the 
appeal of what it considered the civil claims—those related to the 
constitutionality of the secrecy provision of the execution statute.216 The 
court again transferred the stay request to COCA. In the order transferring 
the stay request, the court criticized COCA’s interpretation of the statute, 
saying it ignored the 
clear language of remaining portions of the statute which 
expressly provide for stays to be issued in other circumstances 
than those relating solely to the possibility that a conviction may 
be overturned or a sentence vacated. Subsections (D) through 
(F), all contemplate that stays may be issued by “any state or 
federal court.” In Oklahoma, we determine the courts having 
                                                                                                                 
 207. Id. ¶ 5, 356 P.3d 58, 59. 
 208. Lockett v. State, Nos. D-2000-1330 and D-2003-829 (Okla. Crim. App. Mar. 18, 
2014) (order vacating and resetting execution dates). 
 209. Lockett v. Evans, No. CV-2014-330, slip op. at 2 (Dist. Ct. Okla. Cty. Apr. 1, 2014). 
 210. Lockett III, ¶ 8, 356 P.3d at 60. The plaintiffs also appealed the portion of the 
district court’s order “that the Oklahoma Administrative Procedures Act does not apply to 
the execution protocol and that the protocol does not constitute an unconstitutional 
delegation of authority by the Legislature.” Id. 
 211. See Lockett v. State (Lockett II), 2014 OK CR 3, ¶ 2, 329 P.3d 755, 756-57. 
 212. Id. 
 213. 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1001.1(A) (2011).  
 214. Id. § 1001.1. 
 215. Lockett II, ¶ 2, 329 P.3d at 756-57. 
 216. Lockett v. Evans (Lockett I), 2014 OK 28, ¶ 2, 377 P.3d 1254, 1254 (Mem.). 
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authority to issue such stays in criminal matters are limited to the 
district courts and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals.217  
This is a misinterpretation of the statute. Subsection (A) directs COCA to 
set execution dates.218 Subsection (C) provides specific circumstances 
under which COCA may stay an execution.219 Subsections (D), (E), and (F) 
refer to stays by “any state or federal court,” but those subsections also 
direct COCA to set new execution dates and direct the attorney general to 
notify COCA of the dissolution or vacation of the stay.220 Construing all the 
subsections together, especially the notification provisions, indicates that 
the state and federal courts referred to are courts other than COCA. 
Subsection (C)’s specific limitations on COCA’s ability to issue a stay 
when a challenge is pending before it would be meaningless if COCA were 
free to issue stays without a challenge at all, under the more general 
subsections.  
The supreme court also urged COCA to be “cognizant of the time 
restraints . . . [and] the gravity of the first impression constitutional 
issues,”221 but did not purport to order COCA to issue the stay. COCA 
again declined to issue the stay, reasoning that the statute controlled and 
that “[w]hile the Oklahoma Supreme Court has authority to deem an issue 
civil and so within its jurisdiction, it does not have the power to supersede a 
statute and manufacture jurisdiction in this Court for Appellants' stay 
request by merely transferring it here.”222 
With the first plaintiff’s execution date only a few days away, and 
COCA having denied a request for stay, the supreme court chose to grant 
the stay in a 5-4 decision.223 Although recognizing that the drafters of the 
Oklahoma Constitution “never contemplated” that the supreme court would 
be involved in a death penalty case, the court cited the constitution’s 
access-to-courts provision as the basis for its decision to do so.224  
This case presents a very narrow question: whether these 
appellants should have some access to an appellate tribunal for 
                                                                                                                 
 217. Id. ¶ 3, 377 P.3d at 1254 (quoting OKLA. CONST. art. 7, § 4). 
 218. 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1001.1(A) (2011). 
 219. Id. § 1001.1(C).  
 220. Id. § 1001.1(D)-(E).  
 221. Lockett I, ¶ 4, 377 P.3d at 1254-55.  
 222. Lockett II, 2014 OK CR 3, ¶ 4, 329 P.3d 755, 758. 
 223. Lockett III, 2014 OK 33, ¶ 15, 356 P.3d 58, 61 (per curiam) (Mem.). 
 224. Id. ¶¶ 12-13, 356 P.3d at 61. 
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consideration of a stay of execution based upon the consideration 
of grave first impression constitutional issues regarding the 
manner in which their lives will be taken. More simply, the sole 
issue presented to this Court on this date is whether some court 
should hear their plea for a stay and ensure their constitutional 
right to access to the courts. The Oklahoma Constitution Article 
2, section 6, provides: The courts of justice of the State shall be 
open to every person, and certain remedy afforded for every 
wrong and for every injury to person, property, or reputation; 
and right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial, 
delay, or prejudice.225 
The supreme court’s reliance on this access-to-courts provision was 
questionable. The court previously held that this provision “was intended to 
guarantee that the judiciary would be open and available for the resolution 
of disputes, but not to guarantee that any particular set of events would 
result in court-awarded relief.”226 In Lockett, both plaintiffs had completed 
the entire process of post-conviction remedies in state and federal courts.227 
Further, and more importantly to the stay request at issue, the plaintiffs 
made no attempt to bring the issue within the jurisdiction of COCA by 
filing any further application for post-conviction relief.228 Perhaps they 
believed that such an application would have been unsuccessful because of 
COCA’s decision on related—but not identical—claims in Malicoat v. 
State, where COCA considered other Eighth Amendment challenges to the 
execution procedure.229 Thus, it would appear that the plaintiffs did have 
access to the courts—both previously and in regard to the secrecy claim at 
                                                                                                                 
 225. Id. ¶¶ 10-11, 356 P.3d at 60-61. 
 226. Mehdipour v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Corrs., 2004 OK 19, ¶ 8, 90 P.3d 546, 550 
(citing Rollings v. Thermodyne Indus., Inc., 1996 OK 6, ¶ 9, 910 P.2d 1030, 1032) (holding 
that statute requiring prepayment of filing fees by prisoners who had filed three meritless 
claims was constitutional).  
 227. Lockett II, ¶ 10, 329 P.3d at 761 (Lumpkin, J., specially concurring). 
 228. Id. ¶ 9, 329 P.3d at 760 (“Despite repeated invitations from this Court for 
Appellants to file pleadings to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, Appellants have failed to 
do so.”). Title 22, section 1089 of the Oklahoma Statutes provides for late filings for post-
conviction relief under certain circumstances. In Malicoat v. State, 2006 OK CR 25, ¶ 3, 137 
P.3d 1234, 1235 (citation omitted), COCA considered such a filing, reasoning that “[t]his 
Court has the authority to consider the merits of an issue which may so gravely offend a 
defendant's constitutional rights and constitute a miscarriage of justice.” 
 229. Malicoat, ¶¶ 6-9, 137 P.3d at 1236-38 (rejecting challenges based on the drugs used, 
the training of personnel, and the possibility of conscious pain). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol69/iss2/2
2017]        THE JURISDICTIONAL BOUNDARY 231 
 
 
issue—although they did not receive the desired relief. If the plaintiffs 
lacked access to COCA, it was because they chose to pursue their claims in 
another forum.230  
The court also relied on the “rule of necessity,”231 reasoning that because 
COCA held that it lacked jurisdiction, the supreme court was required to 
decide “the merits of the stay”232 issue. This reasoning was also 
questionable for several reasons. First, although the supreme court correctly 
noted that under the constitution, it alone had the power to determine which 
of the two courts had jurisdiction over the issue, it does not follow that 
COCA “refused to exercise this Court’s order and to address the merits of 
the stay.”233 Deciding a stay request must necessarily include evaluating 
compliance with statutory requirements for the stay. The court’s 
determination that COCA had jurisdiction to decide the matter could not 
have included authority for COCA to disregard statutes when deciding 
whether to issue the stay. Yet the supreme court criticized COCA’s decision 
as “not having followed the constitutional directive of this Court.”234 
Second, and relatedly, the court issued no directive to COCA. As discussed 
previously, the supreme court on rare occasions has used its power to issue 
writs in jurisdictional conflicts with COCA, but the court’s transfer order 
contained no such writ—it merely transferred the stay issue for COCA to 
consider. Finally, the applicability of the rule-of-necessity was tenuous. The 
court stated that the rule “requires a judge to remain in a case regardless of 
the judge's preference, if the sole power to decide a controversy resides in 
that official.”235 Reasoning that COCA “refused to exercise its rightfully 
placed jurisdiction,”236 the court invoked the access-to-courts provision as 
the basis for its determination of necessity.  
We can deny jurisdiction, or we can leave the appellants with no 
access to the courts for resolution of their "grave" constitutional 
claims. As uncomfortable as this matter makes us, we refuse to 
                                                                                                                 
 230. See generally Andrew Spiropoulos, Strategies Leading Up to the Botched Execution 
of an Oklahoma Death Row Inmate, JURIST (June 9, 2014, 5:00 PM), http://jurist.org/ 
forum/2014/06/andrew-spiropoulous-oklahoma-death.php (“The litigation strategy . . . was 
designed to exploit the fault lines in the bifurcated system.”). 
 231. Lockett III, 2014 OK 33, ¶ 13, 356 P.3d 58, 61 (per curiam) (Mem.).  
 232. Id. ¶ 12, 356 P.3d at 61 (emphasis omitted).  
 233. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. ¶ 13, 356 P.3d at 61 (citation omitted).  
 236. Id. 
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violate our oaths of office and to leave the appellants with no 
access to the courts, their constitutionally guaranteed 
measure.237 
But historically, the rule of necessity applies in cases where no judge 
without some self-interest in the case is available to decide the issue 
because the judge or judges with jurisdiction would otherwise be 
disqualified.238 In United States v. Will, the case cited by the court as 
authority, the United States Supreme Court reasoned that the rule of 
necessity is required by the duty of judges to decide cases “within their 
jurisdiction.”239 The rule has never been used where a court merely 
disagrees with another court’s decision. Similar to the access-to-courts 
analysis, necessity is not created by failure to achieve a certain result or 
failure to comply with a court’s procedural requirements. The rule should 
not be a basis for courts to expand their jurisdiction. Had the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court transferred the entire case—not just the stay request—
COCA would have had an action pending before it, within its own 
jurisdiction, and would have had discretion under the statute to issue a 
stay.240 
The supreme court’s basis for retaining any part of the case, beginning 
with the very first appeal, is unclear. The first orders merely referred to the 
claims in the declaratory judgment action as civil matters.241 In its final 
opinion,242 issued two days after the governor announced that she would 
refuse to recognize the order granting the stay,243 the court summarized its 
reasoning regarding the jurisdictional issues. The court first noted that the 
Declaratory Judgment Act could be used as a vehicle to find that a statute 
was unconstitutional, and that the district court’s declaratory judgment that 
the confidentiality provisions were unconstitutional was a final judgment.244 
Declaratory judgment actions are reviewed in the same manner as all other 
                                                                                                                 
 237. Id. 
 238. See United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 211-17 (1980) (discussing history of rule as 
authority for judges hearing and deciding cases despite grounds for disqualification). 
 239. Id. at 215. 
 240. 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1001.1(C) (2011) (“When an action challenging the conviction or 
sentence of death is pending before it, the Court of Criminal Appeals may stay an execution 
date . . . .”) 
 241. Lockett III, ¶ 5, 356 P.3d at 59. 
 242. Lockett IV, 2014 OK 34, ¶ 2, 330 P.3d 488, 489 (per curiam). 
 243. Exec. Order No. 2014-08, 31 Okla. Reg. 618 (Apr. 22, 2014). 
 244. Lockett IV, ¶ 2, 330 P.3d at 489. 
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judgments, so the court concluded that the appeal was within its appellate 
jurisdiction.245 Further, because the act provides that any court with 
jurisdiction can provide further relief as “necessary and proper,” the court 
reasoned that the stay was such further relief and was appropriate injunctive 
relief in aid of its jurisdiction.246  
This rationale is inconsistent with the court’s prior cases. The supreme 
court previously never allowed declaratory judgment actions or civil actions 
for injunctive relief to be used as a way to attack penal statutes or 
proceedings. For example, in Oklahoma State Senate ex rel. Roberts v. 
Hetherington, the court assumed original jurisdiction to dismiss a 
declaratory judgment action because it “invokes the declaratory judgment 
remedy to launch an impermissible collateral attack upon the judgment and 
sentence in a criminal case.”247 Preventing use of declaratory judgment 
actions to construe criminal statutes is particularly important in jurisdictions 
with bifurcated courts of last resort.248  
The Lockett IV court also made the following somewhat cryptic 
comment regarding the jurisdictional boundary between itself and COCA: 
“As concerns the scope of jurisdiction, neither the district court nor this 
Court has undertaken a review of the validity or terms of the judgments and 
sentences in the underlying criminal cases.”249 This statement implies that 
the secrecy provision related to neither the validity nor the terms of the 
sentence. This is a narrow view of the issue in light of the court’s prior 
jurisprudence. Given that the sentences at issue were for executions, issues 
relating to the secrecy of the drug supplier were obviously related to 
                                                                                                                 
 245. Id. ¶¶ 2-3, 330 P.3d at 489-90 (citing 12 OKLA. STAT. § 1654 (2011)). 
 246. Id. ¶ 4, 330 P.3d at 490 (quoting 12 OKLA. STAT. § 1655 (2011)).  
 247. 1994 OK 16, ¶ 1, 868 P.2d 708, 709 (footnote omitted); see also Walters v. Okla. 
Ethics Comm’n, 1987 OK 103, ¶¶ 7-8, 746 P.2d 172, 181-82 (Opala, J., concurring) (“A 
civil court sitting in equity is not ordinarily concerned with the enforcement of criminal 
laws; the power to interpret penal provisions is reposed solely in the courts that exercise 
criminal jurisdiction. . . . The adoption of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act—which 
authorized the district courts to construe the meaning, or pronounce upon the validity, of a 
statute—did not change the time-honored rules that traditionally limit the power of equity to 
construe penal legislation . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
 248. As the Texas courts have reasoned, using declaratory judgment actions in this 
manner would create “potential for conflicting decisions[] between our civil and criminal 
courts of last resort on the validity of such statutes . . . . It is the prospect that civil courts 
will get into the business of construing criminal statutes which represents the real danger.” 
State v. Morales, 869 S.W.2d 941, 948 & n.16 (Tex. 1994). 
 249. ¶ 5, 330 P.3d at 490. 
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implementing the terms of the sentence. The mere fact that a stay of 
execution was sought and considered shows that the action was criminal in 
nature. Issues relating to the carrying out of sentences of execution are at 
least as criminal in nature as the issues regarding application of earned 
credits to sentences, supervision of probated sentences, and continuing 
jurisdiction over youthful offenders, all of which the supreme court has held 
are matters for COCA. Furthermore, related issues had been addressed by 
COCA in Malicoat, thus counseling in favor of COCA jurisdiction, 
analogous to the cases where the supreme court deferred to previous COCA 
decisions construing penal statutes or statutes almost solely related to the 
enforcement of penal statutes.250 
Finally, the court’s attempt to justify its decision to grant the stay by 
interpreting section 1001.1, the statute that COCA relied on in denying the 
stay request, was also unpersuasive.  
In our second transfer order, we concluded the statute authorized 
the Court of Criminal Appeals to grant this statutory remedy, but 
in doing so also said that three subsections in this statute (D, E 
and F) also recognize and accommodate "a stay of execution . . . 
issued by any state or federal court." These subsections clearly 
indicate that the statutory stay remedy in this section is not 
exclusive.251 
This analysis begs the question of whether the supreme court correctly 
assumed jurisdiction over the case or the stay request. The fact that the 
statute recognized the possibility of stays by other courts has no bearing on 
whether this court—the supreme court—had the power to grant one. 
In short, the Lockett saga is troubling as it relates to the jurisdictional 
boundary. It marked the second time in three years that the supreme court 
issued a stay in a criminal case. The court issued the stay despite its 
admission that the constitution’s framers would never have contemplated 
such an act.252 Even had COCA granted the stay at the direction of the 
supreme court, the supreme court still would have been involved in the 
criminal case either by issuing the directive or by deciding issues 
intertwined with the execution. And finally, the court issued the stay 
without articulating a viable basis for classifying the case as civil, merely 
                                                                                                                 
 250. See discussion supra Section II.B.3. 
 251. Lockett IV, ¶ 7, 330 P.3d at 490 (quoting Lockett I, 2014 OK 28, ¶ 3, 377 P.3d 1254, 
1254 (Mem.)). 
 252. Lockett III, 2014 OK 33, ¶ 12, 356 P.3d 58, 61 (per curiam) (Mem.). 
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making the cryptic—and inaccurate—statement about not passing on the 
validity or terms of the sentence.253  
3. Meyer v. Smith 
Meyer v. Smith involved the timeliness of a petition seeking to disqualify 
a trial judge in a criminal case.254 Pursuant to statute255 and its 
constitutional power,256 the supreme court promulgates rules for itself and 
other courts. The rules for district courts require that a petition for 
mandamus be filed within five days after the trial court denies the request to 
disqualify.257 This district court rule states that it applies to both civil and 
criminal cases. But the rule does not explain how days are to be counted. In 
civil cases, the rules of civil procedure apply and provide for counting of 
days excluding weekends and holidays.258 COCA, in contrast, has adopted 
its own rules for criminal cases, as authorized by statute.259 Those rules 
require that calendar days be used.260 When Meyer filed his petition for writ 
of mandamus seven days after the relevant district court order, COCA 
dismissed the petition as untimely.261  
Meyer then sought a writ of mandamus against COCA, urging that the 
supreme court direct COCA to use the business-day rule to calculate 
timeliness.262 The supreme court assumed jurisdiction, citing article 7, 
                                                                                                                 
 253. Lockett IV, ¶ 5, 330 P.3d at 490.  
 254. 2015 OK 86, ¶ 1, 366 P.3d 311, 311 (Mem.). 
 255. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 74 (2011). 
 256. See sources cited infra note 274.  
 257. OKLA. DIST. CT. R. 15(b). 
 258. 12 OKLA. STAT. §§ 2001, 2006 (2011); see also OKLA. SUPR. CT. R. 1.3. 
 259. 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1051(b) (2011). Actually, the statute directs COCA to provide 
rules of procedure for filing an appeal and a petition for a writ of certiorari. The statute does 
not address writs of mandamus or other writs. The Oklahoma Constitution, however, 
provides that in addition to its appellate jurisdiction, COCA has the power to issue writs in 
criminal matters. OKLA. CONST. art. 7, § 4. As noted previously, mandamus is considered to 
be in the nature of appellate jurisdiction, so COCA’s adoption of rules for mandamus is 
consistent with this understanding and its constitutional powers. See supra text 
accompanying note 50. In its response to Meyer v. Smith, COCA cited section 1051(b) as its 
authority for its calendar-day rule. Meyer v. Engle, 2016 OK CR 1, ¶ 3, 369 P.3d 37, 38.  
 260. OKLA. CT. CRIM. APP. R. 1.4.  
 261. Order Declining to Assume Original Jurisdiction and Dismissing Petition for Writ of 
Mandamus at 2, Meyer v. Engle, No. MA-2015-874 (Okla. Crim. App. Oct. 28, 2015). 
 262. Brief in Support of the Application to Assume Original Jurisdiction and Petition for 
Writ of Mandamus at 1-2, 4-5, Meyer v. Smith, 2015 OK 86, 366 P.3d 311 (No. 114409).  
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section 4 of the constitution.263 Presumably, the court was invoking its 
superintending jurisdiction, although it did not explicitly say so. Instead of 
mandamus, the court granted “[d]eclaratory relief . . . to provide for 
uniform computation of the time periods” in Rule 15.264 The court 
announced that “[a]ll time periods shall be computed based upon business 
days whether disqualification is sought in a civil or criminal case.”265 
When Meyer then filed an application with COCA seeking withdrawal of 
its decision on timeliness, COCA rejected the application.266 After a brief 
discussion of the jurisdictional boundary between COCA and the supreme 
court,267 the opinion listed various statutes that COCA had previously held 
require calendar-day computations in criminal cases,268 concluding that 
those statutes support the consistent use of calendar days in COCA’s own 
rules.269 Three judges filed special concurrences, two of those expressing 
extreme discontent with the supreme court’s involvement in the case.270 
One suggested that legislative action might be necessary to “reaffirm 
[COCA’s] exclusive appellate jurisdiction in criminal matters.”271 
Legislative action is not necessary and would not be effective. The 
conflict in Meyer exists not because of a conflict between statutes272 but 
because of an arguable conflict between a statute and the supreme court’s 
power under the constitution. As mentioned above, section 1051 directs 
                                                                                                                 
 263. Meyer, ¶ 1, 366 P.3d at 311.  
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Meyer v. Engle, 2016 OK CR 1, ¶ 17, 369 P.3d 37, 41. 
 267. Id. ¶ 6, 369 P.3d at 38-39. 
 268. Id. ¶ 11, 369 P.3d at 40. 
 269. Id. ¶¶ 13-17, 369 P.3d at 40-41. 
 270. Id. ¶ 1, 369 P.3d at 42 (Lewis, J., specially concurring) (“What troubles me the most 
about this case and its history is that I am no longer surprised that the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court would entertain an extraordinary writ in a criminal case.”); id. ¶ 5, 369 P.3d at 43 
(Hudson, J., concurring) (“The Oklahoma Supreme Court’s actions threaten to create the 
very type of conflicts and confusion in the administration of criminal justice which 
Oklahoma law forbids.”). 
 271. Id. ¶ 3, 369 P.3d at 42 (Lewis, J., specially concurring). 
 272. At first blush, the rulemaking statutes may appear to be in conflict. Title 12, section 
74 directs the supreme court to make and amend rules that “shall apply to the Supreme 
Court . . . and all other courts of record.” However, this statutory authorization is limited to 
rules “as may be required to carry into effect the provisions of this Code [of Civil 
Procedure].” 12 OKLA. STAT. § 74 (2011). Thus, the statutory authorization does not conflict 
with the statute authorizing COCA to make rules for appeals in criminal matters. See 22 
OKLA. STAT. § 1051(b) (2011). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol69/iss2/2
2017]        THE JURISDICTIONAL BOUNDARY 237 
 
 
COCA to create procedural rules for its cases.273 But under its constitutional 
supervisory-control power or general administrative authority,274 the 
supreme court may create rules for inferior courts. And as discussed above, 
COCA is inferior to the supreme court. May the supreme court create a rule 
for district courts that regulates petitions for mandamus to COCA, or direct 
COCA to apply a district court rule in a certain manner, despite the 
legislature’s grant of rulemaking power to COCA? Is the statute granting 
rulemaking power to COCA an unconstitutional intrusion on the supreme 
court’s constitutional power over inferior courts? 
The answer to both questions should be no. The question of whether 
rulemaking power is exclusive to the courts or is jointly shared with the 
legislature has been much discussed and ruled on.275 In Oklahoma, the 
supreme court has recognized that the power is shared and that “rules 
promulgated by the Court must not contravene any constitutional or 
statutory provision upon the same subject.”276 And the court has conceded 
that “the legislative arm of the government has the power to alter and 
                                                                                                                 
 273. 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1051(b) (2011).  
 274. Oklahoma cases most commonly cite article 7, section 6 of the constitution, 
providing for “general administrative authority over all courts in this State” as the basis for 
the supreme court’s rulemaking authority. Other states commonly cite the superintending-
control power as the source of rulemaking authority. See, e.g., District Court of Second 
Judicial District v. McKenna, 881 P.2d 1387, 1390 (N.M. 1994) (holding that promulgating 
rules that regulate procedure is inherent in the power of superintending control); see also In 
re: Rules Regarding Dispute Resolution Act, 57 OKLA. B.J. 863, 876 (1986) (Kauger, J., 
specially concurring) (citing general administrative authority of section 6 and superintending 
control of section 4 as authority for rulemaking); Annotation, Power of Court to Prescribe 
Rules of Pleading, Practice, or Procedure, 158 A.L.R. 705 (1945); cf. McNabb v. United 
States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943) (“Judicial supervision of the administration of criminal 
justice in the federal courts implies the duty of establishing and maintaining civilized 
standards of procedure and evidence.”). 
 275. See, e.g., Mowrer v. Rusk, 618 P.2d 886, 890-91 (N.M. 1980) (“Any action of the 
executive or legislative branch of the municipal government which would preclude the 
Supreme Court or the district court from exercising its superintending or supervisory 
authority over the municipal court violates [the state constitution]."); Charles W. Joiner & 
Oscar J. Miller, Rules of Practice and Procedure: A Study of Judicial Rule Making, 55 
MICH. L. REV. 623, 624 (1957) (surveying states and tracing power to King’s Bench); 
Roscoe Pound, The Rule-Making Power of the Courts, 12 A.B.A. J. 599 (1926) (arguing that 
procedural rulemaking should be solely a function of courts). 
 276. Eberle v. Dyer Constr. Co., 1979 OK 49, ¶ 27, 598 P.2d 1189, 1193 (first citing 
Carlile v. Nat’l Oil & Dev. Co., 1921 OK 163, 201 P. 377; and then Pierce v. State, 1963 
OK CR 58, 383 P.2d 699).  
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regulate the procedure in both law and equity matters.”277 Only where the 
legislature’s action has so intruded on the power of the courts as to violate 
separation-of-powers principles has the supreme court held a statute 
unconstitutional.278 For example, in Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway 
v. Long, the court held unconstitutional a statute requiring courts to hear 
certain types of cases within ten days of the defendant’s answer.279 The 
court reasoned that such a requirement stripped so much discretion from the 
courts as to interfere with the courts’ ability to safeguard the rights of 
litigants.280 In In re Bledsoe, the court held that the legislature could not 
eliminate bar passage as a requirement for bar admission, because it was an 
intrusion on the court’s inherent power to decide who should be admitted to 
practice.281 And in Puckett v. Cook, the court held that a statute prohibiting 
consolidation of cases for trial was an “unconstitutional abridgement” of the 
courts’ power to exercise judicial discretion.282 
The statute granting rulemaking authority to COCA is not analogous to 
the statutes involved in these cases. First, no separation-of-powers issue 
arises. The legislature has delegated power to the judiciary, just not to the 
supreme court. Second, the statute is consistent with the constitution and its 
bifurcation of appellate jurisdiction. Logic and efficiency support a power 
in each court to create its own rules for appeals within its jurisdiction. 
Especially considering that a statute is to be considered constitutional if 
possible,283 the statute giving COCA rulemaking powers easily passes 
muster. Further, were the supreme court to make a rule purporting to 
supersede the COCA rule, any such rule would contravene the statute 
giving rulemaking power to COCA, which the supreme court admits it is 
prohibited from doing.284 And finally, even if despite this reasoning, the 
supreme court considered the grant of rulemaking power to COCA to be an 
                                                                                                                 
 277. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Long, 1926 OK 963, ¶ 16, 251 P. 486, 489.  
 278. See, e.g., Puckett v. Cook, 1978 OK 108, ¶ 13, 586 P.2d 721, 723 (“Where the 
legislature acts with regard to a matter over which courts have ultimate authority, and acts in 
a way to deprive courts of that authority, the legislative act is an unconstitutional 
abridgement of the principle of separation of powers.”). 
 279. ¶ 20, 251 P. at 489.  
 280. Id. ¶ 16, 251 P. at 489. 
 281. 1939 OK 506, ¶ 0, 97 P.2d 556, 556. 
 282. ¶ 5, 586 P.2d at 722. 
 283. Naylor v. Petuskey, 1992 OK 88, n.2, 834 P.2d 439, 440 n.2 (“[T]here is a 
presumption that an act of the legislature is constitutional. Acts of the legislature will be 
construed in harmony with the constitution.” (citation omitted)). 
 284. Eberle v. Dyer Constr. Co., 1979 OK 49, ¶ 27, 598 P.2d 1189, 1193. 
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unconstitutional intrusion on its superintending-power jurisdiction, the 
court should remember that superintending power is a discretionary 
power.285 Uniformity of filing deadlines is a worthy principle. But in view 
of Oklahoma’s system of bifurcated appellate jurisdiction and the need for 
comity and clarity of jurisdictional boundaries, use of the superintending 
power to usurp COCA’s procedural rules seems to be a poor exercise of 
discretion.  
After the COCA opinion in Meyer v. Engle, the petitioner was left in 
limbo. The supreme court’s order lacked a writ of mandamus ordering 
COCA to allow the petitioner to file his petition.286 Instead, the court’s 
order announced a grant of “declaratory relief” that time periods should be 
based on business days in both civil and criminal proceedings to disqualify 
a trial judge.287 COCA considered the order “a request for comity,” which it 
declined to grant.288 After the petitioner requested direction from the 
supreme court, the court wrote that—because it had already ruled—it 
“deem[ed] no further action need be taken,” citing article 7, section 4 of the 
constitution.289  
This is an odd state of affairs. The supreme court knows that COCA 
declined to act in accordance with the supreme court’s decision, so the 
court should take some action either to enforce or withdraw its order. First, 
the supreme court could use its superintending power to order COCA to 
change its rule. As discussed above, this would not be a good use of the 
superintending power. The power should be used sparingly, and its use here 
would conflict with the statute directing COCA to make procedural rules. 
The second obvious course of action is for the supreme court to 
withdraw its order granting declaratory relief. This is effectively the result 
anyway, because COCA ignored the order, and the petitioner’s criminal 
case is proceeding before the judge that the petitioner sought to 
disqualify—without the petition for mandamus ever being considered by 
COCA. If the supreme court had withdrawn its order, at least the rule would 
be clear for the petitioner and other parties who may become similarly 
situated.  
Instead, the third choice of doing nothing, as the supreme court has 
chosen, leaves the rule in a state of ambiguity. The declaratory relief is of 
                                                                                                                 
 285. E.g., Dutton v. City of Midwest City, 2015 OK 51, ¶ 27, 353 P.3d 532, 545-46. 
 286. Meyer v. Engle, 2016 OK CR 1, ¶ 15, 369 P.3d 37, 41.  
 287. Id.  
 288. Id. 
 289. Order, Meyer v. Smith, 2015 OK 86, 366 P.3d 311 (Feb. 29, 2016) (No. 114,409). 
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no benefit to the petitioner, unless he is convicted and somehow convinces 
the supreme court to become involved in his appeal, based on COCA’s 
failure to consider his petition for mandamus. This seems unlikely, because 
if the supreme court were going to press the issue, the time to do that would 
be before the trial, not after. Allowing a trial before the judge in question, 
and then attempting to intervene afterwards, would be a waste of resources 
for all parties and courts. It would also put the supreme court in a position it 
has never been—becoming involved with the merits of a conviction. So the 
result is an order whose only effect is to create ambiguity for future 
petitioners. 
III. Conclusion 
Unlike the Texas court structure of coequal courts of last resort290—
which a Texas Supreme Court justice recently described as a “Rube 
Goldberg-designed judicial ‘system’”291—the Oklahoma Constitution 
provides that the Oklahoma Supreme Court is the final arbiter of the 
jurisdictional boundary between itself and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal 
Appeals. One would think this provision would be a safeguard against 
lingering jurisdictional disputes between the two courts, and for the most 
part, this has been true. In some instances—such as the allocation of 
jurisdiction over grand jury proceedings—the lack of conflict is because the 
courts have worked well together, taking care to provide a clear boundary 
and consistency between criminal and civil issues. In other instances, the 
lack of conflict is because the courts have been extremely deferential to 
each other, even to the extent of ceding jurisdiction over issues arguably 
within their own realms. And even the most recent conflicts should not be 
overstated. Although three times292 in the last five years, the courts have 
                                                                                                                 
 290. TEX. CONST. art. V, §§ 3, 5. 
 291. In re Reece, 341 S.W.3d 360, 378 (Tex. 2011) (Willett, J., dissenting). 
 292. A fourth case, Allen v. State, 2011 OK CR 31, 265 P.3d 754, resulted in somewhat 
competing orders but to a lesser extent than the three cases discussed. In Allen, another 
execution case, the defendant attempted to appeal a jury’s determination of his sanity to be 
executed. Id. ¶ 2, 265 P.3d at 755. The supreme court initially assumed jurisdiction over the 
appeal but reversed itself a year later and transferred the case to COCA. Id. ¶ 2, 265 P.3d at 
755-56. The supreme court’s order stated that the case was transferred to COCA for “a 
constitutionally acceptable substantial and procedural review of the jury’s verdict.” Id. ¶ 4, 
265 P.3d at 756. The defendant argued that this order required COCA to conduct such a 
review. Id. COCA declined, holding that Oklahoma statutes provided for no appeal from the 
jury’s sanity determination and that no review was constitutionally required. Id. ¶ 13, 265 
P.3d at 757. 
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issued orders that compete to some extent, the supreme court ultimately 
declined to assume jurisdiction in one of those—Leftwich—after 
considering briefs and oral argument.  
Yet the supreme court issued a stay in the criminal case in Leftwich—a 
clear crossing of the boundary.293 The most troubling case, of course, was 
Lockett, not only because it was a death penalty case where stakes are 
highest, but also because the publicity surrounding the dueling orders and 
the governor’s announcement that the supreme court had exceeded its 
constitutional authority tends to undermine the public’s confidence in the 
court system.294 And the publicity continues regarding the latest conflict in 
Meyer, including a reminder of the courts’ disputes in the previous two 
cases.295 For that reason alone, the supreme court would be wise to 
recognize a brighter civil-criminal line and articulate specific reasons for 
crossing it. Instead, the court has used a case-by-case approach, which it 
admits has weaknesses: 
This “case-by-case” approach necessarily results in an evolving 
understanding of the appropriate line of demarcation between the 
Supreme Court's jurisdiction and that of the Court of Criminal 
Appeals. The results can be confusing when a more recent 
decision is viewed against the backdrop of older, factually 
similar cases reaching the opposite conclusion on the 
jurisdictional issue. We acknowledge that confusion, but 
conclude that a hard-and-fast rule would not serve the ends of 
justice.296 
The court’s recent opinion in Dutton v. Midwest City purported to 
categorize the types of cases where the supreme court has exercised 
jurisdiction when criminal matters are involved.297 But the opinion lacked 
clarity for those seeking guidance regarding future cases. For example, in 
the “Original Supervisory Civil Jurisdiction” section, one of the categories 
was “other various circumstances where civil jurisdiction exists in this 
                                                                                                                 
 293. See Leftwich I, 2011 OK 80, ¶ 4, 262 P.3d 750, 750-51.  
 294. See generally Lockett IV, 2014 OK 34, 330 P.3d 488 (per curiam).  
 295. Nolan Clay, Oklahoma’s Top Courts’ Judges Squabble Over Duties, OKLAHOMAN 
(Feb. 1, 2016, 12:01 AM), http://newsok.com/article/5475962. 
 296. Movants to Quash Multicounty Grand Jury Subpoena v. Dixon, 2008 OK 36, ¶ 7 
n.1, 184 P.3d 546, 548 n.1 (citations omitted). 
 297. 2015 OK 51, 353 P.3d 532 (holding on various grounds that it lacked jurisdiction to 
adjudicate an appeal from a criminal conviction in municipal court). 
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Court, although its exercise may involve a criminal proceeding.”298 This 
vague category included the appearance bond cases299 and a proceeding to 
oust a public official.300 Thus, the opinion categorized prior decisions but 
did not always offer a cogent rationale for why those decisions had been 
reached. Similarly, in its discussion of the civil-criminal distinction, the 
court cited Mahler for the proposition that punishment is an essential part of 
a criminal case.301 The court followed that with a cite to Lockett IV, using 
the signal “cf.” with the quote indicating that the court had refrained from 
reviewing the validity or terms of the sentence in Lockett IV.302 As 
previously discussed, this distinction is puzzling, at best.  
Two statements from Dutton come close to defining the civil-criminal 
boundary. First, the court reasoned that “if a petitioner’s claim is of such a 
nature that it is normally reviewed by the Court of Criminal Appeals in a 
properly filed proceeding in that Court such as a direct appeal or post-
conviction appeal, then the Oklahoma Supreme Court will not assume 
jurisdiction on that claim.”303 This kind of circular definition may have 
predictive value in some cases but is not useful in less clear cases, and it 
offers no basis for analysis in a close case of first impression. The other 
possibly definitional statement in Dutton was in its explanation of Lynch, 
the case where the court decided the constitutionality of compensation for 
attorneys representing criminal defendants. The court stated that its decision 
did “not include an adjudication of the elements of a defendant’s criminal 
offense, defenses, and personal rights a defendant possesses in his or her 
criminal proceeding as they relate to the criminal cause of action, judgment, 
or sentence,” implying that only an adjudication of one of those items 
would qualify as a criminal case that would be within COCA’s jurisdiction 
under the constitution.304 This description is certainly more predictive of 
                                                                                                                 
 298. Id. ¶ 20, 353 P.3d at 541. 
 299. E.g., Dunn v. State, 1917 OK 269, 166 P. 193; see supra notes 64-70 and 
accompanying text. 
 300. Hale v. Bd. Of Cty. Comm’rs, 1979 OK 158, 603 P.2d 761; see supra note 139. 
Hale was not really a criminal proceeding at all—the statute merely required the ouster to be 
conducted as one. But no criminal punishment was involved. 
 301. Dutton, ¶ 21 n.24, 353 P.3d at 541 n.24. 
 302. Id. 
 303. Id. ¶ 21, 353 P.3d at 541 (emphasis omitted).  
 304. Id. ¶ 23, 353 P.3d at 543. The court made a similar statement regarding Sanders v. 
Followell, the case of statutory interpretation of the attorney-fee statute. “The controversy 
adjudicated by this Court did not involve a part of the criminal cause of action, defenses 
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whether the supreme court would consider an issue civil or criminal. But its 
restrictive wording seems more focused on particular issues rather than 
whether the issue arose in a criminal case, as the constitution specifies. 
Further, applying the description to Lockett indicates that the court should 
have considered the case to be criminal. The secrecy of the supplier of 
drugs used in the execution seems clearly to be an issue regarding personal 
rights possessed by a defendant in his criminal proceeding, relating to his 
sentence.305 Similarly, applying the wording to the issue in Leftwich 
supports the concurring opinion of the sole supreme court justice who 
wanted to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Application of the speech or 
debate clause obviously related to a defense in the criminal proceeding. 
Comparatively, although the Texas courts have also struggled with 
jurisdictional issues caused by bifurcation, they have articulated some broad 
principles to define the boundary. In Texas, the constitution’s jurisdictional 
language is not consistent for the two courts. The Texas Supreme Court has 
appellate jurisdiction over “all cases except in criminal law matters,”306 
whereas the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has appellate jurisdiction “in 
all criminal cases.”307 But the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has writ 
jurisdiction “in criminal law matters.”308 The difference in language—
“matters” versus “cases”—and the varying constitutional language defining 
the Texas Supreme Court’s jurisdiction throughout the years309 have 
resulted in interpretation of both terms. Although the courts have never 
specifically defined a “criminal case,” or a “criminal law matter,” they have 
adopted principles that, for the most part, result in broader jurisdiction for 
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals compared to the jurisdiction of 
COCA. For example, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that an 
appeal from a post-conviction denial of a motion for DNA testing was a 
“criminal case” because it was “closely connected to, and could affect, a 
                                                                                                                 
thereto, or issues relating to the propriety or enforcement of a sentence upon a criminal 
judgment.” Id. 
 305. The same result is reached using the court’s alternate formulation of “issues relating 
to the . . . enforcement of a sentence upon a criminal judgment.” Id. ¶ 23, 353 P.3d at 543. 
The secrecy of the drug supplier relates to the enforcement of the sentence of execution.  
 306. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 3(a). 
 307. Id. art. V, § 5(a).  
 308. Id. art. V, § 5(c). 
 309. Section 3 originally limited the supreme court’s jurisdiction to “civil cases.” Id. art. 
V, § 3 (amended 1981).  
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conviction and sentence . . . in a criminal case.”310 The court relied on 
language in Texas Supreme Court precedent holding that bond forfeiture 
appeals are criminal cases.311 Regarding “criminal law matters,” the court 
has stated that “[i]n our view, average voters reading the phrase ‘criminal 
law matters’ at the time of its adoption would probably have interpreted it 
to encompass, at a minimum, all legal issues arising directly out of a 
criminal prosecution.”312 “Disputes which arise over the enforcement of 
statutes governed by the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, and which 
arise as a result of or incident to a criminal prosecution, are criminal law 
matters.”313  
No definition could provide an easy answer to every issue that might 
arise, but these broad principles are in line with what the public and most 
attorneys would consider to describe a criminal case or a criminal law 
matter, as opposed to a civil case or matter. For example, applying these 
principles to Lockett would clearly define the issue regarding secrecy of the 
drug supplier as criminal. The issue was “closely connected to, and could 
affect” the sentence of execution in the criminal case.314 The execution 
statutes at issue are part of the Criminal Procedure title, and the issue 
                                                                                                                 
 310. Kutzner v. State, 75 S.W.3d 427, 429 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Another of the 
court’s statements was not as helpful, though: “[T]his Court will entertain an appeal 
when . . . it is related to the ‘standard definition’ of a criminal case.” Id. at 431 (quoting 
Bradley v. Miller, 458 S.W.2d 673, 674 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970)).  
 311. E.g., Jeter v. State, 26 S.W. 49, 49-50 (Tex. 1894). 
 312. Lanford v. Fourteenth Court of Appeals, 847 S.W.2d 581, 585 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1993) (assigning a judge to a criminal case was a criminal law matter). 
 313. Curry v. Wilson, 853 S.W.2d 40, 43 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (holding a dispute 
regarding collection from defendant of costs for appointed counsel in capital case was 
criminal law matter). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has sometimes interpreted 
“criminal law matter” even more broadly. For example, the court has stated that “[a]n issue 
does not cease to be a criminal law matter merely because elements of civil law must be 
addressed to resolve the issue.” Armstrong v. State, 340 S.W.3d 759, 765 (Tex. Crim. App. 
2011) (holding a dispute regarding sufficiency of evidence for clerk’s bill of costs in 
criminal case was a criminal law matter); see also State ex rel. Holmes v. Honorable Court 
of Appeals for Third District, 885 S.W.2d 389, 394 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (“Although civil 
and criminal law matters may occasionally overlap, when a matter is essentially criminal, the 
presence of civil law issues will not remove the matter from our jurisdiction.”), abrogated in 
part on other grounds by Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202, 206 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); 
Smith v. Flack 728 S.W.2d 784, 788-89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (“[E]nforcement of an order 
issued pursuant to a criminal statute is a criminal law matter as much as the issuance of the 
order itself, even if it requires this Court to examine civil laws in the process.”). 
 314. Kutzner, 75 S.W.3d at 429.  
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certainly arose “as a result of” a criminal prosecution.315 Furthermore, these 
principles seem to create no more jurisdictional conflicts than the 
Oklahoma system—just differing results—as indicated by the difference in 
jurisdiction of the appearance bond forfeiture cases.316 The Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals was created for the same purpose as COCA—docket 
relief—and these principles are consistent with that purpose.317 Going 
forward, the Oklahoma Supreme Court should articulate similar broad 
principles that would be more predictive of future outcomes, be consistent 
with the purpose of COCA’s creation, and be consistent with the common 
meaning of a “criminal case.”  
Finally, a fair question is whether the disadvantages of this bifurcated 
court system outweigh its advantages, and whether bifurcation at the 
highest level serves any purpose.318 Although outside the scope of this 
                                                                                                                 
 315. In Texas, the Court of Criminal Appeals has reasoned that “[c]learly, the entry of an 
order which stays the execution of a death row inmate is a criminal law matter.” Holmes, 
885 S.W.2d at 394. 
 316. Similarly, attorney fee matters in criminal cases are criminal law matters. Weiner v. 
Dial, 653 S.W.2d 786, 787 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (“The provision for appointment and 
compensation of attorneys to represent indigents in criminal law matters is certainly itself a 
criminal law matter.”). However, there is authority holding that, unlike Oklahoma’s 
decisions, appeals of jury determinations of sanity are not criminal law matters. See Torres 
v. State, 403 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966); Hardin v. State, 248 S.W.2d 487, 487 
(Tex. Crim. App. 1952). But these cases have been criticized for conflating the appealability 
of the determination with whether it was criminal or civil. See Kutzner, 75 S.W.3d at 430-
31; GEORGE E. DIX & JOHN M. SCHMOLESKY, TEXAS PRACTICE SERIES, CRIMINAL PRACTICE 
& PROCEDURE § 57.2 (3d ed.), Westlaw (database updated November 2015). 
 317. William L. Willis, The Evolution of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, 29 TEX. 
B.J. 723, 723 (1966). But see Ben L. Mesches, Bifurcated Appellate Review: The Texas 
Story of Two High Courts, JUDGES J., Fall 2014, at 30 (citing Scott Henson, Caveats to 
Debate on Merging Texas Supreme Court, Court of Criminal Appeals, GRITS FOR 
BREAKFAST (Dec. 13, 2012), http://gritsforbreakfast.blogspot.com/search?q=Caveats+to 
+debate (arguing that the court was created to “facilitate the use of criminal law” to enforce 
Jim Crow policies)). 
 318. See generally 1 STANDARDS RELATING TO COURT ORG. § 1.13 (AM. BAR ASS’N 
1990) (“Where the volume of appeals is such that the state’s highest court cannot 
satisfactorily perform these functions, a system of intermediate appellate courts should be 
organized. . . . The supreme court, or highest appellate court, should have authority to review 
all justiciable controversies and proceedings, regardless of subject matter or amount 
involved.”). The commentary following the standard notes that appellate courts are 
considered to perform two basic functions: error correction and law development. The 
theory behind a court structure with an intermediate appellate court—as Oklahoma has on 
the civil side—is that the workload is distributed so that each court may focus on its role. 
The intermediate appellate court focuses on correcting errors by the trial courts, primarily for 
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article, subject-matter judicial specialization has been criticized on 
numerous grounds in addition to boundary problems.319 In fact, criminal 
law has been singled out as a particularly inappropriate subject matter for a 
specialized court.320 And Oklahoma’s system creates a possibility of 
divergent views on issues that could arise in both courts. Comity between 
the courts has avoided that result so far, with Leftwich being the closest 
call.321  
                                                                                                                 
the benefit of the appellant. The highest court focuses on the law development function—
resolving issues for the community at large. No intermediate court exists on the criminal side 
in Oklahoma, so COCA performs both functions.  
 319. See generally Posner, supra note 9. In addition to boundary problems, three of 
Posner’s arguments against specialization would be relevant to COCA: (1) Insularity—the 
court is cut off from divergent perspectives or broader views that might be provided by non-
specialists, and non-specialists likely do not pay close attention to its decisions; (2) 
Inferiority—the focus solely on criminal issues makes the work repetitive, and it may be 
considered less prestigious than the supreme court; (3) Expertise—the argument is that 
specialized knowledge is not significantly valuable, because judging requires decision-
making expertise rather than subject-matter expertise. Posner also argues that specialized 
courts exacerbate the danger of one ideological view dominating the court, giving a specific 
example of a division in “criminal law between those who emphasize public safety and those 
who emphasize defendants’ rights.” Id. at 783; see also Oldfather, supra note 9. The author 
provides a collection of sources discussing judicial specialization, id. at 849 n.9, and 
considers research into the psychology of expertise. Within discussion of the potential 
inferiority of specialists, Oldfather identifies another potential argument against 
specialization: desensitization. The argument is that “specialized judges will come to view a 
greater fraction of the cases before them as routine . . . . [and thus] engage less deeply.” Id. 
at 860. In contrast, the arguments in favor of judicial specialization are primarily that the 
expertise of specialists leads to better results and efficiency. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, 
Specialized Adjudication, 1990 BYU L. REV. 377, 378 (“If, as common experience suggests, 
experts are better than laymen at dealing with matters in their special areas, the specialized 
judiciary should handle cases more efficiently . . . . Most important, the court’s expertise 
should enable it to craft better opinions . . . .”).  
 320. Henry J. Friendly, Averting the Flood by Lessening the Flow, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 
634, 638-39 (1973) (“[W]hile I am not at all opposed to specialized courts in principle, 
criminal law seems to me the last place for them. The main arguments for specialized courts 
are the need for expertise and for prompt and authoritative determination of the law so that 
people can formulate their conduct accordingly. . . . Neither argument applies to criminal 
law. Its concepts are readily within reach of any competent lawyer, even though, as has been 
the case with many federal judges, he has had little or no criminal practice. Furthermore, 
criminals do not plan their activity with an eye fixed on the . . . Penal Code. . . . Moreover, I 
see actual detriments in a specialized court of criminal appeals. It is too likely to become 
dominated by hard-liners or soft-liners, more likely the former.” (footnote omitted))  
 321. See Leftwich I, 2011 OK 80, 262 P.3d 750. Divergent views appear to exist 
regarding the scope of protection against search and seizure, but no conflicting decisions on 
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But regardless of these potential criticisms, the Oklahoma court structure 
is well entrenched and unlikely to change,322 so the jurisdictional boundary 
should be respected. All three of the supreme court’s recent incursions were 
inconsistent with precedent and ultimately fruitless. In none of the three did 
the supreme court’s involvement change the result that would have 
occurred had the court held that it lacked jurisdiction. So a greater 
acceptance by the supreme court of COCA’s exclusivity, and a better 
articulation of principles to define the boundary, would serve the system 
well. 
 
                                                                                                                 
a single set of facts appear to exist. Compare Turner v. City of Lawton, 1986 OK 51, ¶ 15, 
733 P.2d 375, 380 (“The Oklahoma Constitutional prohibition is broader in scope than its 
federal counterpart, forbidding any unreasonable search or seizure and requiring that the 
place to be searched be described with greater particularity than does the federal 
constitution.”), with State v. Sittingdown, 2010 OK CR 22, ¶ 17, 240 P.3d 714, 718 (“[T]he 
Federal Constitution and the Oklahoma Constitution are the same in the rights protected.”). 
 322. Unlike the Texas system, Oklahoma’s bifurcated system has not been the subject of 
critical commentary. Reform efforts periodically arise in Texas. See, e.g., Mesches, supra 
note 317; Thomas M. Reavley, Court Improvement: The Texas Scene, 4 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 
269 (1973).  
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